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Abstract
There are many situations in which individuals do not expect to find out which outcome will
occur. The standard vNM Expected Utility model is not necessarily appropriate for these
cases, since it does not distinguish between lotteries for which the outcomes are observed
by the agent and lotteries for which they are not. This paper provides an axiomatic model
which makes this distinction, and which admits preferences for observing the outcome as
well as preferences for remaining in doubt. This framework can accommodate behavioral
patterns that are inconsistent with the vNMmodel, and that have motivated the development
of models that differ significantly from the standard vNM framework. In particular, this
framework accommodates self-handicapping, in which an agent chooses to impair his own
performance. It also admits a status quo bias, without having recourse to framing effects.
Several other examples are provided. In one example, voters prefer to remain ignorant, and
as the importance of the relevant issues increases, their incentive to acquire information
decreases.
Keywords: Value of information, uncertainty, recursive utility, doubt, unobserved outcomes,
unresolved lotteries.
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1 Introduction
Models of decision-making under uncertainty usually assume that the agents expect to observe
the resolution of uncertainty ex-post. However, there are many situations in which individu-
als never find out which outcome occurs. In addition to preferring some outcomes to others,
individuals may not be indifferent between remaining in doubt and observing the resolution of
uncertainty. For instance, many people do not want to know whether the goods they buy have
been made by children. Consider also the classical example of genetic diseases. As Pinker (2007)
discusses, “the children of parents with Huntington’s disease [HD] usually refuse to take the test
that would tell them whether they carry the gene for it”. HD is a neurodegenerative disease
with severe physical and cognitive symptoms. It reduces life expectancy significantly, and there
is currently no known cure. A person can take a predictive test to determine whether he himself
will develop HD. A prenatal test can also be done to determine whether his unborn child will
have the disease as well.1 In an experimental study, Adam et al. (1993) find low demand for
prenatal testing for HD. This is supported by a number of other studies as well, and Simpson et
al. (2002) find that the demand for prenatal testing is significantly lower than the demand for
predictive tests. That is, individuals who are willing to know their own HD status are unwilling
to find out their unborn child’s status. The prenatal test is done at a stage in which parents
can still terminate the pregnancy, hence observing the result is an important decision. As for
parents who do not consider pregnancy termination to be an option, the information could still
impact the way they decide to raise their child. For example, if they know that their child will
develop HD, then they might choose to prepare him psychologically for the difficult choices he
himself would one day have to make. On the other hand, if they know that he will not develop
HD, then they would have no such considerations.
The parents’ preferences to avoid the test may seem puzzling; “given the technical feasibility
of prenatal testing in HD, and the severity of the disorder, it might be expected that prenatal
diagnosis would be frequently requested” (Simpson (2002)). It may appear particularly puzzling
that a person who prefers to know now rather than later his own HD status also chooses not
to find out whether his unborn child will develop the disease.2 But note that the average age
of onset for HD is high enough that the subjects who do not see the result of the prenatal test
may never find out whether their children are affected. That is, while choosing the predictive
test mostly reveals a preference for temporal resolution, choosing (or refusing) the prenatal test
mainly reveals a preference for observing an outcome (or remaining in doubt). It is precisely
this type of preference that is the focus of this paper.3
The standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model cannot accommodate
1An affected individual has a 50% chance of passing the disease to each child. The average age of onsets varies
between ages 35 and 55. See Tyler et al. (1990) for details.
2The prenatal test is not costless, as the procedure does involve a small chance of miscarriage. However, this
cost appears small, compared to the severity of the disease.
3In particular, this paper does not consider other factors that are present in the HD example, such as parents’
concern that their child will be treated differently if it is known that he has HD, as discussed in Simpson (2002).
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preferences for knowing which outcome occurs or preferences for remaining in doubt, since it
does not make a distinction between lotteries for which the final outcomes are observed and
lotteries for which they are not. Redefining the outcome space to include whether the prize is
observed does not resolve the issue, as is shown in the appendix. The argument makes use of
the notion that observability should not in itself affect the value of a price. It appears plausible
that if an agent expects an outcome z to occur with probability 1, then his utility would be the
same whether he observes it or not, for he is certain that it occurs.4 Hence, his utility is simply
uz, as opposed to uzo (observed) or uzu (unobserved). Since the outcome z has the same value to
the agent whether it is labeled as ‘z, observed’ or ‘z, unobserved’, there is no degree of freedom
in the standard vNM model for expanding the outcome space to include the observability of z.
In addition, it would be difficult to interpret the meaning of receiving the prize ‘z, unobserved’,
since the agent cannot know he has received the prize without observing it. The observability of
an outcome is fundamentally connected to the uncertainty of receiving the prize, and not just
to the value of the prize.
This paper provides an axiomatic model that accommodates preferences for remaining in doubt
or observing the resolution of uncertainty. The agent’s primitive preferences are taken over
general lotteries that lead either to outcomes that he observes or to lotteries that never resolve
(denoted unresolved lotteries), from his frame of reference, in the sense that he never observes
which outcome occurs.5
This framework extends the standard vNM model, and for that reason makes similar assump-
tions. In particular, a version of the independence axiom is taken to hold. The standard vNM
independence axiom is taken over lotteries that lead only to final outcomes, without specifying
whether the agent observes the resolution of these lotteries. In this framework, the indepen-
dence axiom is taken over more general lotteries which lead to either observed outcomes or to
unresolved lotteries. The justification for assuming the independence axiom in this richer space
is that both observed outcomes and unresolved lotteries are final prizes that the agent receives,
the only difference being that one prize is an outcome and the other is a lottery. It is also
assumed that the agent is indifferent between observing a specific outcome and receiving an
unresolved lottery that places probability 1 on that same outcome, since he is certain of the
outcome’s occurrence. The observation in itself has no effect on the value of the outcome in this
model. This property restricts the agent’s allowable preferences over unresolved lotteries, as is
demonstrated in section 2.
The central result of this paper is a representation theorem that separates the agent’s risk atti-
4The term observation is defined as learning what the outcome is. For example, observing child labor is taken
to mean that the agent learns that child labor occurs. It does not mean that he sees images of child labor taking
place, which could in itself be a difficult experience.
5Throughout this paper, probabilities are taken to be objective. With subjective probabilities, there are cases
in which it may seem more natural to interpret the preferences as state-dependent. For a person who does not
know whether he is talented, for instance, it is unclear whether talent is better viewed as a state of the world or
a consequence.
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tude over lotteries whose outcomes he observes from his risk attitude over unresolved lotteries.
These two attitudes are distinct, and need not coincide. Henceforth, the term ‘caution’ is used
instead of ‘risk-aversion’ for unresolved lotteries, since the agent is not taking any risks per se if
he does not observe the outcome. That is, there is no ‘risk’ that the agent will obtain the worse
outcome rather than the better outcome for an unresolved lottery, since he observes neither
outcome. His final prize is the unresolved lottery itself, not the outcome that ensues without his
knowledge. There is no formal justification for having his valuation of these unresolved lotteries
be dictated by his risk-attitude. For that reason, his caution and his risk-aversion need not be
identical, and his caution must be elicited directly from his preferences over unresolved lotteries.
The difference between the agent’s risk-aversion and his caution induce his doubt-attitude. An
agent who is always more risk-averse than he is cautious is demonstrated to be doubt-prone,
while an agent who is relatively more cautious is doubt-averse. These terms are defined formally
in section 2, and the exact relation between risk-aversion, caution and doubt-attitude is charac-
terized in theorem 6.
Since this model is an extension of the standard vNM framework, the assumptions made are
closely related to the vNM axioms. But note that the distinction between whether an agent
expects to observe the final outcome or not is also ignored in alternative models, such as models
of non-expected utility and cumulative prospect theory. These frameworks therefore do not
take into account the agent’s doubt-attitude. However, it is possible to extend different classes
of models to make the distinction between resolved and unresolved lotteries, and to obtain a
corresponding representation theorem. Section 4 provides a method for extending alternative
models to incorporate unresolved lotteries. A new axiom is presented, since these alternative
models typically do not assume the vNM independence axiom.
The model presented here can accommodate seemingly unrelated behavioral patterns that are
inconsistent with the standard vNM model, and that have motivated frameworks that are sig-
nificantly different. Two important examples are self-handicapping and the status quo bias.
Consider first self-handicapping, in which individuals choose to reduce their chances of succeed-
ing at a task. As discussed in Benabou and Tirole (2002), people may “choose to remain ignorant
about their own abilities, and [...] they sometimes deliberately impair their own performance or
choose overambitious tasks in which they are sure to fail (self-handicapping).” This behavior
has been studied extensively, and seems difficult to reconcile with the standard EU theory.6
For that reason, models that study self-handicapping make a substantial departure from the
standard vNM assumptions. A number of models follow Akerlof and Dickens’ (1982) approach
of endowing the agents with manipulable beliefs or selective memory. Alternatively, Carillo and
Mariotti (2000) consider a model of temporal-inconsistency, in which a game is played between
the selves, and Benabou and Tirole (2002) use both manipulable beliefs and time-inconsistent
6Berglass and Jones (1978) conduct an experiment in which they find that males take performance-inhibiting
drugs, and argue that they do so precisely because it interferes with their performance.
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agents.7
The frameworks mentioned above capture a notion of self-deception, which involves either a
hard-wired form of selective memory (or perhaps a rule of thumb), or some form of conflict
between distinct selves. These models are typically not axiomatized. In contrast, this paper
simply extends the vNM framework, and so the agents cannot manipulate their beliefs (in fact,
all probabilities are objective), and do not have access to any other means for deceiving them-
selves. Yet it can still accommodate the decision to self-handicap, as is shown in section 3.
Intuitively, a doubt-prone agent prefers doing worse in a task if this allows him to avoid infor-
mation concerning his own ability. This is essentially a formalization of the colloquial ‘fear of
failure’; an agent makes less effort so as to obtain a coarser signal.
This model can also accommodate a status quo bias in some circumstances. The status quo bias
refers to a well-known tendency individuals have to prefer their current endowment or decision
to other alternatives. This phenomenon is often seen as a behavioral anomaly that cannot be
explained using the vNM model. On the other hand, it can be accommodated using loss aversion,
which refers to the agent being more averse to avoiding a loss than to making a gain (Kahneman,
Knetch and Thaler (1991)). The status quo bias is therefore an immediate consequence of the
agent taking the status quo to be the reference point for gains versus losses. The vNM model
does not allow an agent to evaluate a bundle differently based on whether it is a gain or a loss,
and hence cannot accommodate a status quo bias. Arguably, this is an important systematic
violation of the vNM model, and is one of the reasons cited by Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler
(1991) for suggesting “a revised version of preference theory that would assign a special role to
the status quo”.
However, in some settings, the model presented here also admits a status quo bias, even without
having recourse to the notion of reference point, gains or losses.8 In the cases where the choices
also have an informational component on the agent’s ability to perform a task well, a doubt-
prone agent has incentive to choose the bundle that is less informative. This leads to a status
quo bias when it is reasonable to assume that holding to the status quo, or inaction, is a less
informative indicator of the agent’s ability than other actions.
In addition, since this model does not make use of the reference point notion, there is no
arbitrariness in defining what constitutes a gain and what constitutes a loss. The bias of a doubt-
prone agent is always towards the least-informative signal of his ability. In fact, in instances
7See also Compte and Postlewaite (2004), who focus on the positive welfare implications of having a degree of
selective memory (assuming such technology exists) in the case where performance depends on emotions. Benabou
(2008) and Benabou and Tirole (2006a, 2006b) explore further implications of belief manipulation, particularly in
political economy settings, in which multiple equilibria emerge. Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) treat a general-
equilbrium model in which beliefs are essentially choice variables in the first period; an agent manipulates his
beliefs about the future to maximize his felicity, which depends on future utility flow. Caplin and Leahy (2001)
present an axiomatic model where agents have ‘anticipatory feelings’ prior to resolution of uncertainty, which may
lead to time inconsistency. Koszegi (2006) considers an application of Caplin and Leahy (2001).
8There are, however, examples of the status quo bias for which this model does not seem to provide as natural
an explanation as loss-aversion does.
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where the status quo provides the most informative signal, the bias would be against the status
quo. For example, an individual could have incentive to change hobbies frequently rather than
obtaining a sharp signal of his ability in one particular field.
The framework presented here admits other instances of seemingly paradoxical behavior. In one
example, an individual pays a firm to invest for him, even though he does not expect that firm
to have superior expertise. In other words, the agent’s utility not only depends on the outcome,
but also on who makes the decision. This result is not due to a cost of effort, but rather to the
amount of information acquired by the decision maker. This framework can also be used in a
political economy setting, as there are many government decisions that are never observed by
voters. As shown in section 3, voters may have strong incentives to remain ignorant over these
issues, even if information is free. This is in line with the well-known observation that there
has been a consistently high level of political ignorance amongst voters in the US (see Bartels
(1996) for details). Surprisingly, this model suggests that if voters care more about policies
that they may never observe, then they have less incentive to acquire information. Finally, this
framework can also be adapted to provide an alternative theoretical foundation for anticipated
regret.9 However, this discussion is outside the scope of this paper, and is deferred to future
research.
The approach used in this paper is related to, but distinct from, the recursive expected Utility
(REU) framework introduced by Kreps and Porteus (1978), and extended by Epstein and Zin
(1989), Segal (1990) and Grant, Kajii and Polak (1998, 2000).10 These earlier contribution
address the issue of temporal resolution, in which an agent has a preference for knowing now
versus knowing later. While the REU framework treats the issue of the timing of the resolution,
this paper treats the case of no resolution. It may appear that simply adding a ‘never’ stage to
the REU space would yield an equivalent representation, but in fact this is not the case. This
distinction is formally discussed in section 4 of the paper. Fundamentally, an agent’s preferences
in a dynamic setting are allowed to differ from period to period, which is the reason why a person
is not indifferent to the timing of resolution. If unresolved lotteries are introduced, then they
must also be allowed to differ from period to period. For instance, an agent may not have the
same preferences over unresolved lotteries after ten years as he does initially. These different
preferences cannot be represented by a set of ‘never’ stages in an REU framework, because each
‘never’ stage cannot lead to any later stages. In other words, each unresolved lottery is itself a
terminal node, and cannot lead to any subsequent nodes. In addition to the formal differences
between the two frameworks, there are also interpretational ones. The REU model captures
a notion of ‘anxiety’ (wanting to know sooner or later) which is distinct from the notion of
9See Loomes and Sugden (1982) for a theoretical model of anticipated regret, and Zeelenberg (1999) for a
review.
10See also Dillenberger (2008). Selden’s (1978) framework is closely related to the Recursive EU model.
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doubt-proneness (not wanting to know at all) addressed here.
This model does not assume the independence axiom for preferences over unresolved lotteries, for
reasons discussed in section 2. Instead, it is argued that the agent should satisfy an ‘information
scrambling consistency’ property, which is itself satisfied by a rank-dependent utility (RDU)
representation. The agent’s doubt-attitude, risk-aversion and cautiousness restrict the allowable
weighting function over the probabilities, and under some conditions, this weighting function
must be linear.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and derives the representation
theorem. Doubt-proneness and doubt-aversion are then defined, and implications of the doubt-
attitude of agents on the representation are discussed. Section 3 presents applications of this
model. Section 4 relaxes the main independence axiom of the framework, and introduces an
axiom that allows different classes of models to incorporate outcomes that are never observed.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model
2.1 General Structure and Representation Theorem Template
This section derives a template for a representation theorem, which is then made precise in the
following subsections. The following objects are used:
• Z = [z, z¯] ⊂ < is the outcome space.
• L0 is the set of simple probability measures on Z. For f = (z1, p1; z2, p2; ...; zm, pm) ∈ L0,
zi occurs with probability pi. The notation f(zi) is also used to mean the probability pi
(in lottery f) that zi occurs.
• L1 is the set of simple lotteries over Z ∪ L0. For X ∈ L1, the notation
X = (z1, qI1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; f2, q
N
2 ; ...; fm, q
N
m) is used. Here, zi occurs with prob-
ability qIi , and lottery fj occurs with probability q
N
j . Note that
n∑
i=1
qIi +
m∑
i=1
qNi = 1.
The reason for using this notation, rather than the simpler enumeration q1, q2, ..., qn is
explained below.
•  denotes the agent’s preferences over L1. , ∼ are defined in the usual manner.
For any X = (z1, qI1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; f2, q
N
2 ; ...; fm, q
N
m), the agent expects to observe the
outcome of the first-stage lottery. He knows, for instance, that with probability qIi , outcome
zi occurs, and furthermore he knows that he will observe it. Similarly, he knows that with
probability qNi , lottery fi occurs. However, although he does observe that he is now faced with
lottery fi, he does not observe the outcome of fi. Lottery fi is referred to as an ‘unresolved’
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lottery. The qIi ’s, q
N
i ’s are used to distinguish between the probabilities that lead to prizes
where he is fully informed of the outcome (since he directly observes which z occurs), and the
probabilities that lead to prizes where he is not informed (since he only observes the ensuing
lottery).11 The superscript I in qIi stands for ‘Informed’, and N in q
N
i for ‘Not informed’.
Denote the degenerate one-stage lottery that leads to zi ∈ Z with certainty δzi = (zi, 1) ∈ L0.
The degenerate lottery that leads to fi ∈ L0 with certainty is denoted δfi = (fi, 1) ∈ L1. Note
that all lotteries of form X = f , where f ∈ L0, are purely resolved (or ‘informed’) lotteries, in
the sense that the agent expects to observe whatever outcome occurs. Similarly, all lotteries of
form X = δf , where f ∈ L0, are purely unresolved lotteries. With slight abuse, the notation
f  f ′ (or δf  δf ′) is used, where f, f ′ ∈ L0. In addition, f  δf (or δf  f) indicates that the
agent prefers (not) to observe the outcome of lottery f than to remain in doubt.
Assumptions are now made to allow the agent’s preferences  to be represented by functions
u : Z → <, and an H : L0 → Z in the following way: for X,Y ∈ L1, X  Y if and only if
W (X) > W (Y ), where W is of the form:
W (X) =
n∑
i=1
qIi u(zi) +
m∑
i=1
qNi u (H(fzi))
This is essentially a standard vNM EU representation, where receiving lottery fzi as a prize has
the same value to the agent as receiving the outcome H(fzi) ∈ Z. The conditions for obtaining
this representation are presented in this subsection, and the next subsections consider assump-
tions that further qualify H.
Axiom A.1 is assumed throughout:
AXIOM A.1 (Certainty): Take any zi ∈ Z, and let X = δzi = (zi, 1) and X ′ = (δzi , 1). Then
X ∼ X ′.
The certainty axiom A.1 concerns the case in which an agent is certain that an outcome zi
occurs. In that case, it makes no difference whether he is presented with a resolved lottery that
leads to zi for sure or an unresolved lottery that leads to zi for sure. He is indifferent between
the two lotteries. Hence axiom A.1 does not allow the agent to have a preference for being
informed of something that he already knows for sure.
The following three axioms are standard.
11Note that it would be straightforward to extend the model to allowing for subsequent resolved lotteries.
However, it would make the notation more cumbersome. For 3 periods, for instance, the preferences would be
taken over L2, where L2 is the set of simple lotteries over Z ∪L1. In this case, the second-stage lottery could also
lead either to an outcome that he observes, or to a lottery whose outcome he does not observe. For more periods,
the notation would make use of recursion, i.e. Lt is the set of simple lotteries over Z ∪ Lt−1.
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XfN1
qI2 =
1
4
1
3
2
3
z1
z3
z4
qN1 =
1
4
qI1 =
1
2
z2
Figure 1: Lottery X = (z1, 12 ; z2,
1
4 ; f1,
1
4),where f1 = (z3,
1
3 ; z4,
2
3)
AXIOM A.2 (Weak Order):  is complete and transitive.
AXIOM A.3 (Continuity):  is continuous in the weak convergence topology. That is, for
each X ∈ L1, the sets {X ′ ∈ L1 : X ′  X} and {X ′ ∈ L1 : X  X ′} are both closed in the weak
convergence topology.
AXIOM A.4 (Independence): For all X,Y, Z ∈ L1 and α ∈ (0, 1], X  Y implies
αX + (1− α)Z  αY + (1− α)Z.
Focusing on axiom A.4, it is noteworthy that the agent’s preferences  are on a bigger space
than in the standard framework. The independence axiom in the standard vNM model is taken
on preferences over lotteries over outcomes, since all lotteries lead to outcomes that are eventu-
ally observed. In this paper, the agent’s prize is not always an outcome zi, and can instead be
an unresolved lottery fi. However, by assumption A.4, there is no axiomatic difference between
receiving an outcome zi as a prize and obtaining an unresolved lottery fi as a prize. Under
this approach, the rationale for using the independence axiom in the standard model holds in
this case as well. Since this section aims to depart as little as possible from the vNM Expected
Utility model, the independence axiom A.4 is assumed throughout. This assumption is relaxed
in section 4 and replaced with a weaker axiom.
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X ′ = δf1
1
2
z1
z2
f1
1
1
2
X = f1
1
2
1
2
z1
z2
Figure 2: Lotteries X = f1 = (z1, 12 ; z2,
1
2), X
′ = δf1 with the same reduction.
Note that the axiom of reduction, under which only the ex-ante probability of reaching each
outcome matters, is not taken to hold in this setting.12 Under reduction, the sequential aspect
of the lottery does not affect the agent’s preferences, which is arguably the case if the delay
between the lotteries is insignificant. But if an agent receives the lottery fi as a prize, then
from his frame of reference the uncertainty never resolves. The delay before observing the final
outcome is not short or insignificant, as it is in fact infinite.
If the reduction axiom were to hold, it would immediately imply that the agent is always indif-
ferent between receiving a resolved and an unresolved lottery. To illustrate this point, consider
the two lotteries X = (z1, 12 ; z2,
1
2) = f1 and X
′ = δf1 (see figure 2). Note that in both lotteries
X and X ′, there is a 12 probability of reaching z1, and a
1
2 of reaching z2. However, for lottery X,
the agent observes the final outcome, while for lottery X ′ he does not. If he were to be indiffer-
ent between X and X ′, then he would also be indifferent between observing and not observing
the outcome. The reduction axiom essentially removes the distinction between lotteries whose
outcomes are observed and the ones whose outcomes are not, and therefore does not allow the
agent to judge them differently.13
The following lemma paves the way for the general representation template that follows.
Lemma 1 (Informed certainty equivalent). Suppose axioms A.1 through A.3 hold. There
exists an H: L0 → Z such that for all f ∈ L0, δH(f) ∼ δf .
12Formally, reduction holds if, for all X = (z1, q
I
1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; f2, q
N
2 ; ...; fm, q
N
m), X
′ =
(z′1, q
′I
1; z
′
2, q
′I
2; ...; z
′
n, q
′I
n′ ; f
′
1, q
′N
1 ; f
′
2, q
′N
2 ; ...; f
′
m′ , q
′N
m′) ∈ L1 such that qI(z) +
∑
qN (z)f(z) = q′I(z) +∑
q′N (z)f ′(z) ∀z, X ∼ X ′.
13See Grant,Kajii and Polak (1998) for a similar discussion in the case of early and late resolution of uncertainty.
See Segal (1990) for a discussion of the related notion of time-neutrality.
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For any lottery f that the agent knows he will not observe, there exists an informed certainty
equivalent H(f): the agent is indifferent between his prize being an unresolved lottery f and
obtaining an outcome H(f).14 One interpretation is that if he does not expect the uncertainty
to resolve, then it is as though the outcome H(f) occurs. Since it is not necessarily the case
that this aggregation is identical to his attitude towards risk (i.e. his marginal utility) for the
informed lotteries, he may not be indifferent between remaining in doubt and observing the
resolution of uncertainty. The theorem below follows naturally from the existence of H and
from the assumptions made so far.
Representation Theorem. Suppose axioms A.1 through A.4 hold. Then there exist a con-
tinuous and bounded function u : Z → <, and an H : L0 → Z such that for all X,Y ∈ L1,
X  Y if and only if W (X) > W (Y )
where W is defined to be: for all X = (z1, qI1 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; ...; fm, q
N
m),
W (X) =
n∑
i=1
qIi u(zi) +
m∑
i=1
qNi u (H(fzi))
Moreover u is unique up to positive affine transformation. If H(f) has more than one element,
then any element can be chosen arbitrarily.
Under this representation, preferences over the resolved part of lotteries are of the standard EU
form, with utility function u. Take a lottery X ∈ L1, in which the agent obtains outcome zi
with probability qIi . In this case, u(zi) enters his W (X) functional linearly, weighted by q
I
i . As
for an unresolved lottery fj that he obtains with probability qNj , it has an informed certainty
equivalent H(fi). Hence u(H(fi)) also enters his functional linearly, weighted by qNj . In that
sense, the representation is an EU representation, where obtaining an unresolved lottery fj as
a prize is equivalent to obtaining a final outcome H(fj). The task now is to find a suitable
representation of H.
2.2 Representations of H
The discussion that follows considers axioms on the unresolved lotteries, that is, only lotteries
of the form X = δf . As there is a natural isomorphism between these lotteries and one-stage
lotteries, the preference relation N is defined in this way, for convenience: δf  δf ′ implies
f N f ′ (and similarly for ∼N , N ).
14H(f) is not necessarily unique, but the agent must be indifferent between the possible outcomes. That is, if
H(f) = z and H(f) = z′ can both occur, then δz ∼ δz′ ∼ δf . Hence either outcome can be chosen arbitrarily in
the representation that follows.
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Since this model is an extension of the standard vNM framework, it might seem that the pref-
erences over the unresolved lotteries should also have an Expected Utility form. The only
additional axiom required for this representation is the independence axiom over N . However,
this does not admit preferences which appear natural, as will be shown. A weaker axiom is then
assumed, and it is demonstrated that under certain restrictions over risk-aversion and doubt-
attitude, the stronger independence axiom must in fact hold.
As a useful first step, the EU representation is first obtained. Since reduction has not been
assumed, the independence axiom over the uninformed preference relation N is not implied
by the independence axiom A.4. It must therefore be explicitly assumed, although it is later
argued that this axiom is not adequate for this setting.
AXIOM H.1 (Independence for N): For all f, f ′, f ′′ ∈ L0 and α ∈ (0, 1], f N f ′ implies
αf + (1− α)f ′′ N αf ′ + (1− α)f ′′.
All the axioms required for an EU representation of N now hold.
Theorem 2 (EU Representation for Purely Unresolved Lotteries). Suppose axioms
A.1-A.4 and axiom H.1 hold. Then there exists a continuous and bounded function v : Z → <
such that for any f, f ′ ∈ L0,
f N f ′ if and only if
∑
z∈Z
v(z)f(z) >
∑
z∈Z
v(z)f ′(z)
Moreover, v is unique up to positive affine transformation. Furthermore, the following holds for
H (where Ev denotes the expectation of v):
H(f) = v−1 (Ev) = v−1
(∑
z∈Z
v(z)f(z)
)
Note that v is the utility function associated with unresolved lotteries, and u remains the utility
function associated with the general lotteries (and final outcomes).15 In this special case, the
preferences over , represented byW (X) (defined in the representation theorem), are essentially
reduced to a two-stage Kreps-Porteus REU form, with a different interpretation. Instead of u
being associated with an ‘earlier’ stage and v with a ‘later’ stage, in this representation u is
associated with the lotteries that are resolved and v with the lotteries that are unresolved.16
However, and perhaps surprisingly, extending an REU model with two stages or more to allow
15It is also case that u(z) > u(z′)⇔ v(z) > v(z′).
16If v is a positive affine transformation of u, then this collapses to a standard EU representation.
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for unresolved lotteries is not equivalent to adding a ‘never’ stage. This discussion is deferred
to section 4.
Limitations of the independence axiom
In the Recursive EU setting with delay in resolution, it could be argued that the agent has a
different risk-attitude in the second stage than in the first stage. This in turn drives his pref-
erence for acquiring information sooner or later, and determines his ‘anxiety’ factor. But this
argument faces a greater challenge in the context of this model. The agent never observes the
second stage, and hence is not taking any risks, in the usual sense of the term. Instead, one
could focus on the interpretation that v(z) represents the weight of each outcome z, and that
the agent’s attitude towards doubt is induced by the difference in his relative weighting of the
outcomes, when the uncertainty does not resolve.
The function v, therefore, contains different notions which cannot be disentangled. It incor-
porates the agent’s valuation of each outcome as well as a notion of caution. In addition, v
fully captures the way he forms his perception of the unresolved lotteries, since v−1(Ev) is his
informed certainty equivalent. The relation between v and u, in turn, determines his attitude
towards doubt.
To illustrate this point, consider again the case of the agent who has had a bad performance
(tb), a mediocre one (tm), or a good one (tg). There are three lotteries over outcomes: f =
(tb, 13 ; tm,
1
3 ; tg,
1
3), f
′ = (tb, 12 ; tg,
1
2) and δm = (1, tm).
17 Assume that if he expects to ob-
serve the outcome, a risk-averse agent has a preference for being certain his performance was
mediocre rather than having the lottery f , and might prefer the less risk lottery f to lottery f ′:
δm  f  δf ′ . Furthermore, suppose that f N f ′ N δm. For instance, the agent might prefer
to remain in doubt and obtain f ′ rather than obtaining δm and being certain of a mediocre
performance, because of the way he forms his perception if he does not see the outcome. Since
he is risk-averse when he expects to observe the outcome, then perhaps he is also cautious when
he does not expect to observe the outcome, and prefers f to f ′. f is better for a cautious agent,
and has the benefit, for a doubt-prone agent, of also being similarly uninformative.
The plausibility of these preferences depends on the interaction between the notions of risk,
caution and doubt-attitude. He is cautious and prefers lottery f to f ′, and he also prefers to
stay in doubt rather than knowing that he is mediocre. Note, however, that these preferences
violate independence. In fact, they violate the stronger axiom of betweenness, and so do not fall
in the Dekel (1986) class of preferences.18
This example highlights the possible conflicting attitudes that are merged together in the func-
tion v. In particular, an agent can be optimistic about his perception of the unobserved outcome
17Alternatively, consider a donor to a charity, who does not know whether his donation is being put to the best
possible use.
18Note that f = 2
3
f ′ + 1
3
δm. Hence this is a violation of independence (and betweenness) since the following
does not hold: f ′ N 23f ′ + 13δm N δm. More specifically, this violates quasi-convexity.
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and still be cautious. The number of different notions merged together suggests that a more
flexible representation should be allowed for the preferences over unresolved lotteries, even while
choosing to stay within the standard framework for the general lotteries.
In this example, f ′ N δm does not necessarily imply that f ′  af ′ + (1 − a)δm N δm for
all a ∈ (0, 1). Now let f˜ ′ = (tb˜, 12 ; tg˜, 12), where tb˜, tg˜ are such that f ′ ∼N f˜ and tb < tb˜ <
tg˜ < tg.19 With the independence axiom H.1 over unresolved lotteries, it would follow that
af ′+(1−a)δm ∼N af˜ ′+(1−a)δm for all a ∈ (0, 1). In other words, there is no difference in the
agent’s risk-aversion (caution), in the standard sense of the term. But using the same reasoning
as in the example above, this model should allow a strict preference, since the agent may have a
preference for being more or less informed. That is, since the interval [tb˜, tg˜] is smaller than the
interval [tb, tg], the lottery af˜ ′ + (1− a)δm is less ‘scrambled’ than the lottery af ′ + (1− a)δm.
Hence, this model should allow the agent to have this type of preference:
1. af ′ + (1− a)δm N af˜ ′ + (1− a)δm for some a ∈ (0, 1)
or
2. af˜ ′ + (1− a)δm N af ′ + (1− a)δm for some a ∈ (0, 1)
It may also be the case that for some a ∈ (0, 1), the agent has a preference for more scrambled
information (case 1) and for some a′ ∈ (0, 1), the agent has a preference for less scrambled
information. Suppose, for now, that there exists some a ∈ (0, 1) such that case 1 holds. Let
fˆ = (tbˆ,
1
2 ; tgˆ,
1
2), where tbˆ, tgˆ are such that fˆ ∼N f . If tbˆ < tb < tg < tgˆ, then it should also be
the case that afˆ ′ + (1 − a)δm N af ′ + (1 − a)δm. If, instead tb < tbˆ < tgˆ < tg, then it should
instead be that af ′ + (1− a)δm N afˆ ′ + (1− a)δm. That is, the optimistic (pessimistic) agent
with a preference for more (less) scrambled information prefers a lottery with a larger (smaller)
distance between the good and the bad outcome.
This property is generalized in the next part of the discussion. It is then shown that this property
is satisfied by rank-dependent utility (henceforth RDU). Following this, doubt-attitude is defined,
and the relation between doubt-attitude, risk aversion and caution is characterized in theorem
6.
Rank-dependent utility
Although this section considers RDU axioms for the preference relation associated with unre-
solved lotteries, note that for the general preference relation, , the independence axiom A.4
still holds. For that reason, the overall representation will consist of a combination of the EU
and the RDU frameworks. The representation theorem template presented earlier still holds,
19If monotonicity holds in this example, then with stochastic dominance, either tb < tb˜ < tg˜ < tg or tb˜ < tb <
tg < tg˜ must hold.
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but the H function will no longer have the form v−1(Ev). Note that if the independence axiom
A.4 were to be relaxed as well, it would not be equivalent to relaxing the independence axiom
in each stage of the Recursive EU model. This is discussed in more detail in section 4.
Hereafter it is assumed, for simplicity, that higher outcomes are strictly preferred to lower out-
comes, i.e. z N z′ ⇔ z > z′.20 The following notation is used: for lottery
f = (z1, p1; z2, p2; ...; zm, pm) ∈ L0, the z′is are rank-ordered; i.e. zm N ... N z1. In addition,
p∗i denotes the probability of reaching outcome zi or an outcome that is weakly preferred to
zi. That is, p∗i =
∑m
j=i pj . Note that for the least-preferred outcome z1, p
∗
1 = 1. Probabilities
p∗i are referred to here as ‘decumulative’ probabilities. Following Abdellaoui (2002), the rank-
dependent utility form is defined in this manner:
Definition (RDU) Rank-dependent utility (RDU) holds if there exists a strictly increasing
continuous probability weighting function w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1 and a
strictly increasing utility function v : Z → < such that for all f, f ′ ∈ L0,
f N f ′ if and only if VRDU (f) > VRDU (f ′)
where VRDU is defined to be: for all f = (z1, p1; z2, p2; ...; zm, pm),
VRDU (f) = v(z1) +
m∑
i=2
[v(zi)− v(zi−1)]w(p∗i )
Moreover, v is unique up to positive affine transformation.
If RDU holds, then the function H is represented as follows, as shown in the appendix:
H(f) = v−1 (VRDU (f))
Note that if the weighting function w is linear, then VRDU reduces to the standard EU form.21
The standard motivation for rank-dependent utility is to separate the notion of diminishing
marginal utility from that of probabilistic risk aversion, which expected utility does not do. The
aim here is different; in fact the standard EU form still holds for the general setting. Instead,
this model separates the notion of caution (which remains identical to diminishing marginal
unresolved utility) from his optimism (or pessimism) in the way he forms his perception of the
unobserved outcome. Specifically, as discussed in the previous subsection, an optimistic agent
prefers to have more scrambled information. He prefers to know less, so as to form a more
20It follows from the certainty axiom A.1 that if the the higher outcomes are preferred to the lower outcomes,
δz  δz′ ⇔ z > z′.
21This is not the most common form of RDU. Given the rank-ordering above, the typical form would be
VRDU =
∑n−1
i=1 [w(p
∗
i )−w(pi+1)∗]v(zi)+w(pn)v(z∗n). It is easy to check that the two representations are identical.
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reassuring perception of the outcome. A pessimistic agent, on the other hand, prefers sharper
information, since knowing less would lead him to form a more negative perception. This prop-
erty is summarized below:
Definition (ISC) N satisfies information scrambling consistency (ISC) if:
let f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn), f ′ = (z1, p1; ...z′i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈ L0 such
that f ∼N f ′, and case 1 : (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1) (case 2 : (zi, zi+1) ⊂ (z′i, z′i+1)). If, for some
a ∈ (0, 1) and some z ∈ (z′i, z′i+1):
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz
then it must also be that:
af˜ + (1− a)δz˜ N af˜ ′ + (1− a)δz˜
for any f˜ = (z˜1, p1; ...z˜i; pi; z˜i+1, pi+1; ...; z˜n, pn), f˜ ′ = (z˜1, p1; ...z˜′i; pi; z˜
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; z˜n, pn) and z˜
such that z˜ ∈ (z˜′i, z˜′i+1) ⊂ (z˜i, z˜i+1) (case 2 : z˜ ∈ (z˜i, z˜i+1) ⊂ (z˜′i, z˜′i+1)).
A preference for more scrambled information corresponds to case 1, i.e. preferring af+(1−a)δz 
af ′+(1−a)δz when (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1). Similarly, a preference for less scrambled information
corresponds to case 2.22 Note that the ISC property allows an agent to prefer more scrambled
information for some a ∈ (0, 1) and less scrambled information for another a′ ∈ (0, 1). In other
words, an agent’s pessimism or optimism may depend on how likely he believes an outcome to
occur.23. This property is satisfied by an RDU representation:
Theorem 3. Suppose that RDU holds for N . Then N satisfies ISC.
In the discussion above, optimism (pessimism) have been associated with a preference for more
(less) scrambled information, as described by the two cases in the ISC property.24 But note that
the notions of optimism (pessimism) have a different meaning in the RDU setting, as they are
associated with concavity (convexity) of the weighting function w (see Wakker (1994)). In fact,
if the weighting function is concave (convex), then an agent always prefers more (less) scrambled
information, and so the two notions of optimism (pessimism )coincide.
22This a separate notion from risk: for a risk-averse agent in the standard EU setting, f ∼N f ′ implies that
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz, for any a ∈ (0, 1) and any z ∈ Z.
23Note also that this notion of pessimism (optimism) is separate from risk. In a standard EU setting, f ∼N f ′
would always af + (1− a)δz  af ′ + (1− a)δz, for any a ∈ (0, 1) and any z ∈ Z.
24Only the cases (z′i, z
′
i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1) and (zi, zi+1) ⊂ (z′i, z′i+1) are considered. For any other case, f ∼N f ′
would violate stochastic dominance, which will not be allowed in this model.
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Theorem 4. Suppose that N satisfies RDU , and let w be the associated weighting function.
Then w is concave (convex) if and only if:
for any f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn), f ′ = (z1, p1; ...z′i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈ L0
such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1), and for all a ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ (zi, zi+1), the
following must hold:
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz
(convex w : af ′ + (1− a)δz N af + (1− a)δz)
There is therefore no formal difference between an agent who always prefers more (less) scrambled
information, as defined above, and an optimist (pessimist), in the usual RDU sense of the term.
The axiomatic foundation of the RDU representation is now briefly discussed, in the context of
this model. Suppose that
fα = (z1, p1; ...;α, pi; ...; zm, pm) N (z′1, p1; ...;β, pi; ...; z′m, pm) = f ′β
f ′κ = (z′1, p1; ...;κ, pi; ...; z′m, pm) N (z1, p1; ...; γ, pi; ...; zm, pm) = fγ
where α, β, γ, κ ∈ Z.
Comparing lotteries fα and fγ , the only difference is in whether α or γ is reached with prob-
ability pi. Since all the other outcomes are the same in both lotteries and are reached with
the same probabilities, the difference is in the value of outcome α compared to the value of
outcome γ (and similarly for f ′β,f
′
κ and β, κ). In the comparison of fα N f ′β and f ′κ N fγ ,
all the probabilities of reaching the (rank-preserved) outcomes are the same. For that reason,
it is assumed in this model that the switch in preference is due to a difference in the value of
outcomes α and β relative to γ and κ, and not in the way the probabilities are aggregated. It
is precisely this property that RDU provides: if fα N f ′β and f ′κ N , fγ , and if N is of the
RDU form, then v(α)− v(β) ≥ v(γ)− v(κ). Note that this does not depend on the choice of z′s
and p′s, and so the following axiom, adapted from Wakker (1994), must hold:
AXIOMH.1RA (Wakker tradeoff consistency for N): Let fα = (z1, p1; ...;α, pi; ...; zm, pm),
fγ = (z1, p1; ...; γ, pi; ...; zm, pm), f ′β = (z
′
1, p1; ...;β, pi; ...; z
′
m, pm) and f
′
κ = (z
′
1, p1; ...;κ, pi; ...; z
′
m, pm).
If:
fα N f ′β
f ′κ N fγ
then for any lotteries gα = (zˆ1, pˆ1; ...;α, pˆi; ...; zˆmˆ, pˆmˆ), gγ = (zˆ1, pˆ1; ...; γ, pˆi; ...; zˆmˆ, pˆmˆ), g′β =
(zˆ′1, pˆ1; ...;β, pˆi; ...; zˆ′mˆ, pˆmˆ), g
′
κ = (zˆ
′
1, pˆ1; ...;κ, pi; ...; zˆ
′
mˆ, pˆmˆ) such that gγ N g′κ,
it must be that gα N g′β .
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Under this axiom, only the values of α,β,γ and κ are relevant to the ordering of the agent’s
preferences when all the probabilities of reaching all other outcomes are the same across the
four lotteries. In fact, as shown in Wakker (1994), this axiom is sufficient, along with stochastic
dominance and continuity, for the RDU representation to hold.
Theorem 5 (RDU Representation for Purely Unresolved Lotteries). Suppose axioms
A.1-A.4, and H.1R hold. In addition, suppose that N satisfies stochastic dominance. Then:
RDU holds for N . Furthermore, H(f) = v−1 (VRDU (f)).
Consider again the notions of optimism and pessimism in this context. An agent who always
prefers more scrambled information is referred to as an optimist, and has a concave weighting
function w. Extensive research has been done on the shape that seems to hold, empirically,
on w in the usual RDU setting.25 As this a different setting, assumptions over the shape of
w are not made. In particular, while it is common to assume that w is S-shaped (concave on
the initial interval and convex beyond), an empirical discussion of w for the unresolved lotteries
is outside the scope of this paper. Instead, it is shown that the induced preferences to remain
in doubt or not to remain in doubt have strong implications on the weighting function w. In
particular, under certain conditions described below, the weighting function is constrained, and
under strong enough restrictions it must be linear.
Implications of doubt-aversion and doubt-proneness
Doubt-aversion and doubt-proneness are defined in the following way:
Definition (Doubt-attitude)
• An agent is doubt-prone if: (i) there exists no f ∈ L0 such that f  δf and (ii) there
exists some f such that δf  f .
• An agent is doubt-averse if (i) there exists no f ∈ L0 such that δf  f and (ii) there
exists some f such that f  δf .
• For two agents A and A˜ with associated preference relations  and ˜, agent A is at least as
doubt-prone as agent A˜ if, for all f ∈ L0, (i) δf ˜f =⇒ δf  f , and (ii) f  δf =⇒ f˜δf .
In other words, an agent who (weakly, and strictly for one lottery) prefers not to observe than
to observe the outcome of a lottery is doubt-prone, and an agent who always prefers to ob-
serve the outcome is doubt-averse. No strong stance is taken in this section concerning whether
attention should be restricted mostly to doubt-proneness or to doubt-aversion, or indeed, to
25See Karni and Safra (1990), and Prelec (1998) for an axiomatic treatment of w.
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doubt-proneness in some range and doubt-aversion in another. The result below connects the
assumptions on doubt-proneness to properties of the probability weighting function w(p); a sim-
ilar result hold for doubt-aversion, and is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 6. Suppose that axioms A.1 through A.4 and the RDU axioms hold, and let u and
v be the utility functions associated with the resolved and unresolved lotteries, respectively, and
w be the decision weight associated with the unresolved lotteries. In addition, suppose that u, v
are both differentiable. Then:
(i) If there exists a p ∈ (0, 1) such that p < w(p), then there exists an f ∈ L0 such that δf  f .
Similarly, if there exists p′ ∈ (0, 1) such that p′ > w(p′), then there exists an f ′ ∈ L0 such that
f ′  δ′f .
(ii) If  exhibits doubt-proneness, then p ≤ w(p) for all p ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, if v exhibits
stronger diminishing marginal utility than u, then N violates quasi-convexity. (that is, there
exists some f ′, f ′′ ∈ L0, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f ′  f ′′ and αf ′ + (1− α)f ′′ N f ′).
The differentiability assumption, though common, may seem bothersome as it is not taken over
the primitives. Alternatively, an assumption could be made over the primitives that guarantees
(for instance) strict concavity of u and v, which would in fact be sufficient for the result.26 Given
the results above, an assumption or deduction over the attitude towards doubt has testable im-
plications over the attitude towards the aggregation of probabilities, and vice-versa. In addition,
these implications can be disentangled from the attitude towards diminishing marginal utility.
Since it is not necessary that w satisfies the same empirical properties as for the typical case
considered under rank-dependent utility, an experimental study would be useful for a better
sense of the shape of w.
If, in addition to doubt-proneness, mean-preserving risk-aversion (in the standard sense) of N
is assumed, then the RDU representation collapses to the recursive EU representation:
Corollary. Suppose that axioms A.1 through A.4 and the RDU axioms hold, and let u and v
be the utility functions associated with the resolved and unresolved lotteries, respectively, and w
be the decision weight associated with the unresolved lotteries. In addition, suppose that u, v are
both differentiable. Then:
If  displays doubt-proneness and N displays mean-preserving risk-aversion, then VRDU must
be of the EU form. That is, w(p) = p for all p ∈ L0. It also follows that both u and v are
concave, and that u = λ ◦ v for some continuous, concave, and increasing λ.
This result further shows that attitude toward risk and attitude towards doubt constrain the
probability weighting function, and can in fact completely characterize it.27
26For a discussion of the differentiability assumption, see Chew, Karni and Safra (1987).
27This last corollary is similar to a result in Grant, Kajii and Polak (2000) but with a notion of doubt-proneness
that is weaker than the preference for late-resolution that would be required in the framework they use; the
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Returning to the task example, note that if the assumption of mean-preserving risk aversion is
to be maintained, then it cannot be that the agent is doubt-prone everywhere, as this would
imply by the last result that the unresolved lotteries satisfy the vNM axioms. However, this is
not consistent with these preferences’ violation of independence. Hence f˜  δf˜ for some f˜ ∈ L0.
Since the agent prefers δf to f , for f = (tb, 13 ; tm,
1
3 ; tg,
1
3), he is therefore doubt-prone in some
region and doubt-averse in others. If instead the assumption of mean-preserving risk-aversion is
discarded, then it is possible for him to be doubt-prone everywhere. Note that this entails that
quasi-convexity is violated, which corresponds precisely to the violation discussed in motivating
the use of this framework. Finally, in the typical case of a regressive S-shaped w function, it
must be that the agent is doubt-prone for some lotteries and doubt-averse for others, by theorem
6.
3 Applications
Two applications are considered in this section. In the first, an agent’s utility depends directly
on his ability, since it is related to his self-image. He may never fully observe his ability, but his
success at performing tasks provides him with an imperfect signal. How well he performs a task
also depends on his effort. Performing a task better provides him with a reward, and so in the
standard EU setting, he would always put in as much effort as he can if effort is costless. In this
setting, however, there is a tradeoff between obtaining a better reward by putting in more effort
and obtaining a coarser signal of ability by putting in less effort. Under some conditions, the
agent has an incentive to self-handicap, as is shown below. This setup also accommodates other
well known behavioral patterns. Under one version of this setup, an agent has an incentive to
remain with the status quo. In another version of this setup, a risk-neutral agent prefers less
risky bonds with a lower expected return to more risky stocks with a higher expected return.
This agent is also willing to pay a firm to invest for him, even if he knows that the firm does
not have superior expertise.
In another application, voters all have the same preferences, but they do not know who the
better candidate is. However, they can acquire this information at no cost. It is shown that
there are equilibria in which they choose to remain ignorant, and the wrong candidate is as
likely to win as the right candidate.28
difference in assumptions is due to the difference in settings. It is also of note that under Grant, Kajii and Polak
(2000)’s restriction, there is no need to assume differentiability, as it is in fact implied.
28In some cases, ‘disappointment’ may seem an appropriate notion in the circumstances described below. A
person’s fear of failure may stem from not wanting to be disappointed by what he finds out about himself, or not
wanting to be disappointed by the outcome. This terms is not used in this paper to avoid confusion, as it has a
distinct meaning in other settings. Disappointment aversion is typically used in discussions of the Allais Paradox,
as a possible explanation for the common ratios effect (see Gul (1991) for a theoretical model).
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3.1 Preservation of self-image
A general setup is first introduced, and the implications of the results are then analyzed in differ-
ent contexts. The agent is assumed to place direct value on his ability (or talent), independently
of the effect it has on his monetary reward. Arguably, individuals care about their self-image,
and would rather think of themselves as talented than untalented. Their success at achieving
their goals, given how much effort they put in, provides them with imperfect signals of their
talent.
Suppose then that the agent is endowed with talent t ∈ [t, t] ∈ <. He does not know what his tal-
ent is, but his prior probability of having talent t is p(t). The agent chooses effort e ∈ [e, e] ∈ <,
to obtain a reward m ∈ [m,m] ∈ <. Although the agent may never observe his talent, he does
observe m. The reward depends on his talent, the effort he puts in, and an intrinsic uncertainty.
Let p(m|e, t) denote his probability of receiving reward m given his effort e and his talent t.
Since he does not know what his talent is ex-ante, his prior probability of receiving m given
effort e is p(m|e) =
∑
t∈[t,t]
p(m|e, t)p(t). Assume that the expected reward is higher if he puts in
more effort for any given talent, and it is higher if he is more talented at any given effort level:
Em(e, t) > Em(e, t′)⇔ t > t′, and Em(e, t) > Em(e′, t)⇔ e > e′.29
The agent’s value function W depends on both his reward m and on his intrinsic talent t. As-
sume that his utility for m is linear; more precisely, his expected utility over m is Em(e). In
addition, it is linearly separable from his utility over t. He is weakly risk-averse over t (for both
resolved and unresolved lotteries) as well as doubt-prone.30 As in the theory section, let u be
his resolved utility, and let v be his unresolved utility.
If the agent expects to observe both his talent t and his reward m, then his value function
is:
W (e) = Em(e) + Eu(t)
Since effort is costless, it is immediate that he should put in the highest level of effort, e = e.
But now suppose that he does not necessarily observe his talent ex-post. In this case, when he
receives his monetary reward, he simply updates his probability on his talent, given m and his
chosen effort level e. His value function is therefore:
W (e) = Em(e) +
∑
m
p(m|e)u ◦ v−1(Ev(t|m, e))
Depending on the functional form, the agent might not put in effort e = e. His effort level
also depends on his incentive to obtain the least information concerning his talent, since he is
29All the probability distributions in this section have finite support.
30Note that by the corollary of theorem 6, the weighting function here is linear, w(p) = p. Note also that
the agent being doubt-prone and risk-averse in the unresolved lotteries also implies that he is risk-averse in the
resolved lotteries, by the same corollary.
21
doubt-prone. In other words, he takes into account what the combination of his effort and the
reward he obtains allow him to deduce about his talent. Suppose that there is an effort level
eo (the ‘ostrich’ effort) that is entirely uninformative, i.e. p(t|m, eo) = p(t) for all t ∈ [t, t] and
for all m ∈ [m,m]. Note that eo provides the agent with the highest expected utility of talent.
That is, define
C(e) ≡ u ◦ v−1(Ev(t))−
∑
m
p(m|e)u ◦ v−1(Ev(t|m, e))
As shown in the appendix, it is always the case that C(e) ≥ 0 for a doubt-prone agent, with
C(eo) = 0. Redefining the value function to be W˜ (e) = W (e) − u ◦ v−1(Ev(t)), the agent
maximizes
W˜ (e) = Em(e)− C(e)
Hence C(e) is effectively the ‘shadow’ cost of effort due to acquiring information that he would
rather ignore. The optimal effort level depends on the importance of the expected reward Em(e)
relative to the agent’s disutility of acquiring information concerning his talent, as is captured
by C(e). As an illustration, a simple example is provided.
Numerical Example
Let e = t = 0, e = t = 1, p(t = 0) = 12 and p(t = 1) =
1
2 . The agent’s reward m only takes value
$0 and $100. The probability of obtaining reward m = $100 given e and t are:
p(m = $100|t = 1, e) = e
p(m = $100|t = 0, e) = 0
and p(m = $0|t, e) = 1 − p(m = $100|t, e). The utility functions are u = a√t for some a > 0,
and v = t.
Note that in this example, the completely uninformative effort eo is equal to 0. At effort e = 0,
he is sure to obtain $0, and his posterior on his talent is the same as his prior. As he puts in
more effort, he obtains a sharper signal of his talent. If he puts in maximum effort e = 1, then
he will fully deduce his talent ex-post: if he obtains $100 then he knows he has talent t = 1, and
if he obtains $0 then he knows he has talent t = 0. His value function is now:
W˜ (e) = 50− C(e)
where C(e) = a2 (
√
2− e−√2− 3e+ e2).
The optimal level of effort e∗ is in the full range [0, 1], depending on a. More precisely, for interior
solutions, e∗ is the smaller root of the equation e2 − 3e + 2d−9d−4 = 0, where d =
(
200
a + 2
)2. As
a increases, the monetary reward m becomes less significant, and e∗ decreases. As a decreases,
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the utility of talent becomes less significant, and the effort level increases (see appendix for
details).
Self-handicapping
The setup presented here can be applied to several different contexts, the most immediate
of which is self-handicapping. There is strong anecdotal evidence that people are sometimes
restrained by a ‘fear of failure’, and will not put in as much effort as they could. Berglas and
Jones (1978) find in an experiment that individuals deliberately impede their own chances of
success, and attribute this behavior to people’s desire to protect the image of the self.31 The
amount of optimal self-handicapping depends on the doubt-attitude of the agent, and how good
of a signal he expects to obtain. As discussed above, choosing a higher effort level leads to a
tradeoff between the improved reward Em(e) and the incurred cost C(e) of learning more about
one’s actual talent. This model also confirms Berglas and Jones’ intuition that those who are
more likely to self-handicap are not the most successful or the least successful, but rather those
who are uncertain about their own competence. Akerlof and Dickens’ (1982) observation that
people will remain ignorant so as to protect their ego is also in agreement with the implications
of this framework.
Status quo bias
The endowment effect and status quo bias are analyzed by Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler (1991),
and are explained using framing effects and loss aversion. The agent’s preference for avoiding
a loss is taken to be stronger than his preference for making a gain, and the reference point
for what constitutes a gain or a loss is assumed to be the status quo. However, Samuelson and
Zeckhauser (1988) do not view the status quo bias to be solely a consequence of loss-aversion:
“Our results show the presence of status quo bias even when there are no explicit gain/loss
framing effects.... Thus, we conclude that status quo bias is a general experimental finding –
consistent with, but not solely prompted by, loss aversion.” The framework discussed here can
be applied to some settings in which a status quo bias is present.
Suppose that e now represents a choice over different bundles rather than effort. In addition,
suppose that acquiring a bundle also carries information concerning prizes that the individual
may never observe. In this case, rather than representing a cost of effort, C(e) represents the
cost of deviating from the bundle over which one has the most bias. Since C(e) is smallest when
e = eo (the ostrich effort), the bias here is towards what is least informative. This result is
therefore consistent with the status quo bias when inaction (keeping the same bundle) is less
informative than taking action. Note, however, that when keeping the status quo bundle is more
informative than obtaining other bundles, then a doubt-prone agent would be biased against
the status quo.
The key difference between the model presented here and the standard vNM model is that
31See Benabou and Tirole (2002) for an explanation that uses manipulable beliefs.
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this model allows for an asymmetry in the value of acquiring a bundle compared to losing that
bundle. The bundle itself does not change value based on whether the agent is endowed with
it or not, and in that sense there is no framing effect. Instead, acquiring a new bundle in itself
has different informational implications than selling it. In the case where the unobserved prize
is the agent’s ability, then acquiring a new bundle may provide him with more information on
his ability than keeping the one he currently has.
Bonds, stocks and paternity
Consider the case in which e represents an investment decision rather than effort. A higher e
represents a more risky investment, but in expectation it leads to a higher monetary reward. As
before, t corresponds to a notion of talent. A more talented individual makes a wiser investment
choice and therefore obtains a higher expected monetary reward, given the chosen risk level. For
instance, e might be a portfolio consisting solely of bonds, while e consists solely of higher-risk
stocks. Assume also that eo = e. In other words, the riskless option is also least informative
concerning the agent’s potential as an investor.
In this setting, although the agent is risk-neutral in money, his chosen bundle e∗ may still consist
of more bonds than it would if the reward were purely monetary, as there is a bias towards e.32
In addition, suppose that a firm exists which offers to invest the agent’s money in his place.
Even if the agent puts the same prior on his ability in investing as he does on the firm’s, he
still agrees to pay. Since the optimal level of risk in this case is e, he is willing to pay up to
Em(e) − Em(e∗) + C(e∗). In fact, even if the firm were to choose the suboptimal level e∗, he
would be willing to pay up to C(e∗).
In the standard EU model, the agent’s choice would only depend on the monetary reward he
expects to obtain. In contrast, the framework presented here allows the agent’s choice to depend
on the decision making process as well as on the reward he expects to receive. That is, the agent
bases his choice on the manner in which he expects to obtain the monetary reward.
3.2 Political Ignorance
The high degree of political ignorance of voters has been thoroughly researched, particularly
in the US (see Bartels (1996)). Given the length of electoral campaigns in American politics,
the amount of media coverage and the accessibility of informational sources, it seems that the
cost of acquiring information should not be prohibitive for voters. Note that there are political
issues whose resolution the voters may never observe. For instance, the voters may choose not
to observe the amount of foreign aid given, the degree of nepotism, or the government stance on
interrogation methods. For those issues, a doubt-prone agent may have incentive to ignore in-
formation even if information is free. In other words, making information more accessible would
not necessarily have a strong impact on the individual’s informativeness on these issues. Since
32Of course, no claim is made concerning the empirical significance of this effect.
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voters affect the election result as a group, each individual’s decision to acquire information has
an externality on other voters and on their decision to acquire information. This section dis-
cusses a very simple example in which voters’ information acquisition plays a dominant role on
the other voters’ decision to acquire information. Although voting is sincere, there is a strategic
aspect to the decision to acquire information.
Consider an economy in which N citizens care about issue γ ∈ [0, 1], which is determined by
a politician that they vote for. They can choose never to observe what the politician does.
Suppose that there are two candidates, A and B. One of the two will choose policy γ = 0 if
elected, and the other will choose γ = 1. The voters do not know which one is which, and place
probability 12 that A will choose γ = 0, and
1
2 that A will choose γ = 1 (and similarly for B).
However, they can acquire that information at no cost, if they choose to do so. Let pi be the
ex-post probability that the ith agent places on the winner being the candidate who implements
γ = 1, where i ∈ {1, .., N} . The timing is as follows:
1) Each voter decides whether or not to observe where candidates A and B stand. A voter
cannot force another voter to acquire information.
2) Each voter votes sincerely, i.e. he votes for the candidate on whom he places a higher
probability of implementing policy γ that he prefers. If he is indifferent or if he places
equal probability on either candidate implementing his preferred policy, then he tosses a
fair coin and votes accordingly.
3) The candidate who obtains the majority wins the election. In case of a tie, a coin toss
determines the winner. The winner then implements the policy he prefers, and there is no
possibility of reelection.
Now suppose that every voter prefers γ to be higher. In addition, every voter is also strictly
doubt-prone. Let his value function be WI if he acquires information and WN if he does not.
Even though every voter prefers the candidate who implements γ = 1, and even though in-
formation is free, there is still an equilibrium in which no one acquires information, and the
candidate who implements γ = 0 wins with probability 12 . This equilibrium is Pareto-dominated
(in expectation) by the other equilibria, in which at least a strict majority of agents acquires
information, and the candidate who implements γ = 1 wins with probability 1. This is briefly
shown below.
1) Equilibrium in which no voter is informed:
If no other voter is informed, then voter i does not acquire information either. Since pi ∈ (0, 1)
if no one else is informed, it follows that WI < WN (on his own he cannot force pi ∈ {0, 1}).
25
Unless agent i is certain that either the right candidate or the wrong candidate always wins the
election, i.e. that pi = 1 or that pi = 0, he does not acquire information.
Note that there is no equilibrium in which a minority of voters acquires information, since each
voter in the minority has incentive to deviate. Note also that the difference between WI and
WN for a given pi ∈ (0, 1) is higher if the difference between the agent’s utility of γ = 1 and
γ = 0 is larger.
2) Equilibrium in which at least a strict majority is informed:
If at least a strict majority is informed, then the right candidate wins with probability 1. Hence
pi = 1 for each agent i, and so he is indifferent, since WI = WN . Note, however, that this
equilibrium does not survive if each voter i places an arbitrarily small probability δ > 0 that
each of the other voters does not acquire information.
The externality of information plays an excessive role in this simple example, however it may
still have an impact in a more realistic model. In particular, this example suggests that as
the difference between the agent’s utility of the good policy and his utility of the bad policy
increases, a doubt-prone agent has less incentive to acquire information.
4 Extensions
In this section, a general methodology for extending other models is first presented. The relation
between this model and Kreps-Porteus is then discussed, and it is shown, using the general
methodology introduced here, that the models are formally distinct, even if independence axioms
are to hold at every stage. This last result may appear counterintuitive, since it may appear that
a ‘never’ stage is formally equivalent to a ‘much later’ stage, but with a different interpretation.
The reasons for the distinction between the two models is also discussed.
4.1 General Methodology
The vNM EU model has been extended in this paper to allow for the distinction between lotteries
that lead to observed outcomes and lotteries that never resolve, from the agent’s viewpoint. A
general methodology for extending other models to make this distinction as well is now provided.
These models do not need to satisfy the general independence axiom A.4. A new axiom is
introduced instead. This axiom is weak enough to accommodate a broad class of continuous
preferences, including a strict preference for randomization.
Suppose that an agent is indifferent between receiving an outcome z˜ as a final prize and an
26
unresolved lottery f . It is now assumed that the agent is also indifferent between receiving
unresolved lottery f with some probability q and prize z˜ with probability q. In other words,
the agent’s valuation, or perception, of unresolved lottery f is assumed to be independent of
the probability with which he received it, or on the probability of receiving any other prize.
The value placed on unresolved lottery f and the value placed on outcome z˜ are always the
same.
AXIOM E.1 (Unresolved lottery equivalent): For all f ∈ L0 such that
δf ∼ δH(f), and for all X, X˜ ∈ L1 such that X = (z1, qI1 ; ...; zn, qIn; f, q; f2, qN2 ; ...; fm, qNm) and
X˜ = (z1, qI1 ; ...; zn, q
I
n;H(f), q; f2, q
N
2 ; ...; fm, q
N
m), the following holds: X ∼ X˜.
Recall that H(f) ∈ Z is well-defined for all f ∈ L0 (by lemma 1), and that this does not require
the general independence axiom A.4. Axiom E.1 has not been explicitly assumed in the main
model because it is trivially implied.
Lemma 2. Suppose axioms A.1 through A.4 hold. Then axiom E.1 holds.
However, without the independence axiom A.4, it is no longer the case that E.1 necessarily
holds. If it is explicitly assumed, however, then any lottery
X = (z1, qI1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; f2, q
N
2 ; ...; fm, q
N
m) ∈ L1 can be replaced with a lottery
Xˆ = (z1, qI1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; H(f1), q
N
1 ;H(f2), q
N
2 ; ...;H(fm), q
N
m) ∈ L0. Note that X ∼ Xˆ,
by a repeated application of axiom E.1. This property essentially reduces two-stage lotteries to
one-stage lotteries. It therefore allows a straightforward extension of different types of frame-
works, so as to distinguish between resolved and unresolved lotteries. To emphasize this point,
suppose that a ‘simple model’ is loosely defined as follows:
Definition (Simple Model) A simple model 〈ˆ,W, T 〉 consists of :
• A preference relation ˆ over one-stage lotteries in L0.
• A representation W : L0 → < for which x ˆ x′ ⇔W (x) ≥W (x′) for all x, x′ ∈ L0.
• A set of axioms T that allow ˆ to be closed in the weak convergence topology, and that
are sufficient for representation W to hold.
Then, any simple model can be expanded to accommodate the distinction between resolved and
unresolved lotteries, in the following way. Take a simple model 〈ˆ,W, T 〉. Since it is usually
implicitly assumed that the agent will observe the outcome of a lottery, suppose that for all
x, x′ ∈ L0, x ˆ x′ ⇔ x  x′. That is, the set of axioms T is taken to hold for all resolved
lotteries. If in addition, axioms A.1 through A.3 and axiom E.1 hold, then  is represented as
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follows: for any X,X ′ ∈ L1, X  X ′ ⇔ W (Xˆ) > W (Xˆ ′).33 As for a representation of H, note
that the set of axioms for unresolved lotteries considered in the paper can also be replaced by a
second simple model 〈ˆN ,WN , TN 〉.
Conditions for obtaining doubt-neutrality (indifference between observing and not observing the
outcome) for preferences that satisfy A.1 through A.3 are now provided. This simple result
demonstrates that assuming doubt-neutrality has strong implication on the agent’s allowable
preferences, independently of the independence axiom A.4. Recall that for lotteries f, f ′ ∈ L0,
the notation f  f ′ denotes a comparison between lotteries that the agent expects to observe;
while δf  δf ′ denotes a comparison between the same lotteries, but they remain unresolved.
Doubt-neutrality result. Suppose axioms A.1 through A.3 hold. Then the following three
conditions are equivalent:
(i) f ∼ δf for all f ∈ L0
(ii) f  f ′ ⇒ δf  δf ′ for all f, f ′ ∈ L0
(iii) δf  δf ′ ⇒ f  f ′ for all f, f ′ ∈ L0
In words, suppose that an agent has a choice between observing and not observing the outcome
of a lottery. Then he is always indifferent, for this type of choice, if and only if the order
between any lotteries f, f ′ ∈ L0 is always strictly preserved. That is, if he strictly prefers
f to f ′ when he expects to observe the outcome, then he also strictly prefers f to f ′ if he
does not expect to see the outcome. Arguably, condition (i) is often violated, even in models
that depart significantly from the standard vNM model. Consider, for instance, the following
variant of Machina’s (1989) mother example. Suppose that a donor to a charity has no strict
preference over which worthwhile cause receives the benefit from his donation, but he prefers
that it be decided randomly, for reasons of fairness. He may still prefer not to observe which
cause receives it, and to remain in doubt (and perhaps this encourages him to donate to an
umbrella organization rather a more targeted one). It must therefore be the case that there are
some lotteries f, f ′ over the recipients which he ranks differently based on whether he observes
the outcome.
Finally, note that a number of models have a dynamic component. The Kreps-Porteus frame-
work, for instance, allows for preferences for temporal (sequential) resolution. The method
33Where, as before, for X = (z1, q
I
1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; f2, q
N
2 ; ...; fm, q
N
m),
Xˆ = (z1, q
I
1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; H(f1), q
N
1 ;H(f2), q
N
2 ; ...;H(fm), q
N
m) ∈ L0, and similarly for X ′ and Xˆ ′.
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presented in this section for extending models can also be used at every stage to admit prefer-
ences over unresolved lotteries. It may appear that this procedure is equivalent to adding one
last ‘unresolved stage’ to the sequence, but in fact it is not, as is now shown.
4.2 Relation to Kreps-Porteus
Suppose now, for simplicity, that there are 2 stages of resolution (early and late) in a Kreps-
Porteus (KP) setup. In addition, suppose that all the KP axioms hold so that an expected
utility representation holds at both stage. The early and late stages have associated utility
functional denoted by ue and ul, respectively. Define the expectation operator in the usual way.
The objects used are:
• Let R1 be the set of simple lotteries over L0 (recall that L0 is the set of simple lotteries
over the outcome space Z).
• Denote typical element X = (f I1,e, qI1,e; ....; f In,e, qIn,e) ∈ R1, where f Ii,e ∈ L0.
• The KP agent has preferences K over lotteries X ∈ R1.
His preferences can be represented as follows:
For X ,Y ∈ R1, X K Y if W(X ) >W(Y), where W is of the following form:
W(X ) =
∑
qIi,eue
(
u−1l
(
Eul(z|f Ii,e)
))
Using the methodology from the previous section to allow KP to incorporate this model, suppose
now that at every stage, there is a possibility of reaching unresolved lotteries. The objects used
are now:
• Let Rˆ1 be the set of simple lotteries over L1 ∪ L0.
• Denote typical element Xˆ = (fˆ I1,e, qI1,e; ...; fˆ In,e, qIn,e; fN1,e, qN1,e; ...; fNm,e, qNm,e) ∈ Rˆ1, where
fˆ Ii,e ∈ L1, and fNj,e ∈ L0.
• Elements fˆ Ii,e ∈ L1 lead to late stage lotteries over prizes zi,l ∈ Z that are observed and
lotteries fNj,l ∈ L0 that are unresolved, with the following notation:
fˆ Ii,e = (z1, q
I
1,l; ...; zn,l, q
I
n,l; f
N
1,l, q
N
1,l; ...; f
N
m,l, q
N
m,l)
• The KP agent has preferences ˆK over lotteries Xˆ ∈ Rˆ1.
Suppose now that an independence axiom for unresolved lottery holds at every stage. That is,
define N,e and N,l in the natural way, and let an independence axiom hold for each of these
preferences. In this case, there are unresolved utility functions ve, vl associated with N,e and
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N,l, respectively. Note that ve and vl need not be the same, since N,e and N,l are separate.
Hence, there are four utility functions in this setting: ue and ul, which are associated with early
and late general lotteries, as well as ve and vl which are associated with early and late unresolved
lotteries. It is immediate, therefore, that having a KP model that accommodates unresolved
lotteries is formally distinct from simply adding a ‘never’ stage, as this can only account for one
additional utility function. The reason for this distinction is that the agent’s perception of the
unresolved lotteries need not be the same in the early stage as it is in the second stage.
Note that there is another, and perhaps more fundamental, difference between temporal reso-
lution and lack of resolution. While the early stage leads to the eventual occurrence of the late
stage, there is no notion of sequence for unresolved lotteries. That is, the first unresolved lottery
cannot lead to a second lottery; each unresolved lottery is a final prize, and hence a terminal
node. For that reason, while the KP representation will have terms such as ue(u−1l (·), there
cannot be an equivalent unresolved term, ve(v−1l (·). To make this point less abstract, consider
the representation for the agent’s preference in this context:
For Xˆ , Yˆ ∈ Rˆ1, Xˆ ˆK Yˆ if Wˆ(Xˆ ) > Wˆ(Yˆ), where Wˆ is of the following form:
Wˆ(Xˆ ) =
∑
qIi,eue
(
u−1l
(
Eul(z|f Ii,e) +
∑
qNi,lul
(
v−1l
(
Evl(z|fNi,l )
))))
+
∑
qNi,eue
(
v−1e
(
Eve(z|fNi,e)
))
Note that in this representation, both utility functions ve and vl are terminal, in the sense that
the expectations are over outcomes, and not over any further lotteries. Suppose now that the
agent is indifferent between early and late resolution of uncertainty. In other words, suppose that
the functions ue(·) and ul(·) are identical (up to positive affine transformation), and denoted by
u(·). Then reduction does hold for resolved lotteries, in the sense that only the probability of
reaching an observed outcome z matters, and not the sequence. Let this probability of reaching
observed outcome z be simply qI(z). Then the representation of the agent’s preferences are now
reduced to:
Wˆ(Xˆ ) =
∑
qI(z)u(z) +
∑
qIi,e(z)
(∑
qNi,lu
(
v−1l
(
Evl(z|fNi,l )
)))
+
∑
qNi,eu
(
v−1e
(
Eve(z|fNi,e)
))
While the notation is cumbersome, this representation demonstrates that each unresolved lottery
is essentially a final prize, and its value depends on whether it is obtained early or late. An
agent’s preferences over unresolved lotteries are allowed to vary in time, even when he has neutral
preferences over the timing of resolution of uncertainty.
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5 Closing remarks
This paper provides a representation theorem for preferences over lotteries whose outcome may
never be observed. The agent’s perception of the unobserved outcome, relative to his risk-
aversion, induces his attitude towards doubt. This relation is captured by his resolved utility
function u, his unresolved utility function v and his unresolved decision weighting function
w. The model presented here is an extension of the vNM framework, and it does not entail
a significant axiomatic departure. However, it can accommodate behavioral patterns that are
inconsistent with expected utility, and that have motivated a wide array of different frameworks.
For instance, doubt-prone individuals have an incentive to self-handicap, and this incentive is
higher if they are less certain about their competence. Note that this model does not allow agents
to be delusional, since they are unable to mislead themselves into having false beliefs. Doubt-
prone individuals are also more likely to choose the status quo bundle, if making a decision is
more informative than inaction. In addition, an agent who is risk-neutral may still favor less
risky investments, and would pay a firm to invest for him, even if it does not have superior
expertise. The agent’s attempt to preserve his self-image implies that his utility depends not
only on the outcome that results, but also on the action taken. In a political economy context,
doubt-proneness encourages political ignorance. When individuals derive more utility from the
policies that they are not required to observe, they have less incentive to acquire information.
Moreover, agents have a greater disutility from acquiring information if they are more ignorant
ex-ante.
Finally, note that experiments that address the impact of anticipated regret frequently allow
for foregone outcomes that agents do not observe (see Zeelenberg (1999)). These experiments
would be useful in determining plausible degrees of doubt-proneness, although this is outside
the scope of this paper.
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Appendix
The appendix is structured as follows. Part 1 explains why the standard EU model is inappro-
priate when the agent does not expect to observe the resolution of uncertainty. Part 2 provides
an example of the ‘preservation of self-image’ application. All the proofs are in part 3.
A.1 Limitations of the standard EU model
This example illustrates the problem with using the standard vNM EU model when there are
outcomes that the agent never expects to observe. Consider the simple case of an agent who has
performed a task and does not know how well he has done. There are no future decisions that
depend on his performance. For example, as a simple adaptation of Savage’s omelet, suppose
that the agent does not know whether he has fed his guests a good omelet or a bad one. With
probability pt, he has done well (t), and with probability (1 − pt) he has done badly (t). He
prefers having done well to having done badly, although this will have no future repercussions.
Given the choice between remaining forever in doubt (D) and perfectly resolving the uncertainty,
(ND), it might appear that he compares:
UD = ptu(t) + (1− pt)u(t)
to
UND = ptu(t) + (1− pt)u(t)
and that since UD = UND, he is indifferent. But UD is not necessarily the right function to use
if he chooses to remain in doubt, because from his frame of reference the final outcome will not
be t or t. That is, he does not expect to ‘obtain’ ex-post utility u(t) or u(t) because he does
not expect to observe either t or t. As it is not clear what his perception of the consequence is
if he does not expect the uncertainty to be resolved (from his viewpoint), his expected utility is
undetermined. In its current form, the standard EU model does not offer a method for evaluating
this choice. Using UD effectively ignores that the relevant frame of reference is the agent’s, not
the modeler’s.34
Redefining the outcome space to include the observation itself does not eliminate the problem.
Suppose that the outcome space is taken to be Z = {tD, tD, tND, tND} where tD represents the
outcome that he did well but doubts it, tND that he did well and does not doubt it, and so
34This issue is not resolved by starting with preferences over lotteries as primitives. In the standard framework,
the agent has primitive preferences over lotteries over outcomes, and he is not allowed to choose between lotteries
whose resolution he observes and lotteries whose resolution he does not observe. He is therefore not given the
option to express those preferences.
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forth. He therefore compares the following:
UD = ptu(tD) + (1− pt)u(tD)
to
UND = ptu(tND) + (1− pt)u(tND)
It is difficult to interpret the meaning of the consequence ‘did well, but doubts it’ from his frame
of reference, since it is not clear what it means to be in doubt if he knows that he has done
well. In addition, his preferences over tD and tD are completely pinned down. Consider the two
extremes, pt = 1 and pt = 0. When pt = 1, there is no intrinsic difference between UD and
UND, since he knows that he has done well. Hence, u(tD) = u(tND). Similarly, when pt = 0,
he knows he has done badly, and so u(tD) = u(tND). It then follows that UD = UND for any
pt ∈ [0, 1]. This definition of the outcome space is essentially the same as simply Z = {t, t}.
His indifference between remaining in doubt and not remaining in doubt is a consequence of
following this approach, it is not implicit from the standard EU model.
Redefining the outcome space so that his utility is constant if he remains in doubt is even more
problematic. Suppose that Z = {tND, tND, D}, letting tND be the outcome ‘talented and he
does not remain in doubt (he observes the outcome)’, TND be the outcome ‘untalented and
he observes it’, and letting D mean that he does not observe the outcome, hence remaining in
doubt. He now compares:
UD = u(D)
to
UND = ptu(tND) + (1− pt)u(tND)
However, in the limit pt → 1, UD should approach UND, which only occurs if u(D) = u(tND).
But in that case, as pt → 0, UD does not approach UND, and so there is an unavoidable
discontinuity.
A.2 Applications
Numerical Example (Preservation of Self-image)
The following is a more general version of the numerical example provided in the main body of
the paper. Suppose he puts in effort e ∈ [0, 1], and obtains reward m ∈ [0, 100]. He also has
an unobserved talent t ∈ [0, 1] . The agent is doubt-prone and risk-averse for both resolved and
unresolved lotteries on talent. Specifically, u = at1/2 for some a > 0, and v = t. His expected
utility of money is linearly separable from his utility of talent, and is equal to his expected
reward Em. He therefore maximizes:
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W˜ (e) = Em(e)− C(e)
where C(e) ≡ u ◦ v−1(Ev(t))−
∑
m
p(m|e)u ◦ v−1(Ev(t|m, e))
The agent’s prior is q that talent t = 0, and 1− q that talent t = 1. He can put in level e ∈ [e, e].
Given that he has talent t = 1 or t = 0 and puts in effort e, his respective probabilities of ob-
taining monetary reward m = 100 are p(100|t = 1, e) = e and p(100|t = 0, e) = be, for b ∈ [0, 1).
Note that the ostrich effort e0 in this example is e = 0, since he is certain to obtain m = 0,
independently of his talent. It follows from the probabilities given above that:
p($0|1, e) = 1− e
p($0|0, e) = 1− be
p(100|e) = e(q + b(1− q)
p($0|e) = 1− e(q + b(1− q))
p(1|100, e) = q
q + b(1− q)
Solving:
W (e) = 100 ∗ p(100|e) + a (p(0|e)p(t)p(0|t, e))1/2 + a (p(100|e)p(t)p(100|t, e))1/2
= e(100β + a(βq)1/2) + aq1/2
(
1− e(1 + β) + βe2)1/2
where β = q + b(1 − q). Let γ = 100β + a(βq)1/2, and D = 4γ2
a2q
. Then, from the first order
conditions, we obtain:
e2(βC − 4β2) + e(4β − C)(1 + β) + C − (1 + β)2 = 0
The example in the text corresponds to the case b = 0, q = 1/2, and so β = 1/2, γ = 50 + a2 ,
and d = 2D =
(
200
a + 2
)2.
A.3 Proofs
Lemma 1 (Informed certainty equivalent). Proof. Define N in the same way as in the
text, i.e. δf  δf ′ ⇔ f N f ′ (and similarly for ∼N , N ). Note that N inherits continuity,
and so there exists a function H : L0 → Z such that δH(f) ∼N f for all f ∈ L0. By the certainty
axiom A.3, it follows that δH(f) ∼ δδH(f) . Hence δH(f) ∼ δf .
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Representation Theorem. Proof. Let X = (z1, qI1 ; z2, q
I
2 ; ...; zn, q
I
n; f1, q
N
1 ; f2, q
N
2 ; ...; fm, q
N
m).
By lemma 1, δf ∼ δH(f) for any f ∈ L0. Hence, by a well-known implication of the independence
axiom A.4, X ∼ X˜, where X˜ = (z1, qI1 ; z2, qI2 ; ...; zn, qIn; H(f1), qN1 ;H(f2), qN2 ; ...;H(fm), qNm),
and so X ∼ X˜. Defining Y˜ similarly, Y ∼ Y˜ . By transitivity, X  Y ⇒ X˜  Y˜ . Note that all
lotteries X˜ and Y˜ are one-stage lotteries, with final outcomes as prizes. Define the preference
relation I in the following way: X  Y ⇒ X˜ I Y˜ . All the EU axioms hold on I , and so
X˜  Y˜ if and only if W (X˜) > W (Y˜ ), where
W (X˜) =
n∑
i=1
qIi u(zi) +
m∑
i=1
qNi u (H(fzi))
and W is unique up to positive affine transformation. But since X  Y ⇒ X˜  Y˜ , it follows
that X  Y if and only if W (X˜) > W (Y˜ ), which completes the proof.
Theorem 2. Proof. Since all the axioms required for an EU representation of N hold, it is
immediate that N can be represented by an expected utility function v. For any f ∈ L0,
δH(f) ∼N f , since δH(f) ∼ f (by definition of H), and δδHf ∼ δH(f) (by the certainty axiom
A.1. Hence v(H(f)) =
∑
z∈Z
v(z)f(z). It follows that H(f) = v−1
(∑
z∈Z
v(z)f(z)
)
. If there
exists more than one v−1(·), any can be chosen arbitrarily: suppose v(z˜) = v(z˜′) =
∑
z∈Z
v(z)f(z).
Then by the certainty axiom A.1, δz˜ ∼ δδz˜ and δz˜′ ∼ δδz˜′ , hence δz˜ ∼ δz˜′ , from which it
follows that u(z˜) = u(z˜′). Since they have the same value, either z˜ or z˜′ can be used in the
representation. Note also that it follows from the certainty axiom A.1 (and transitivity) that
δz  δz′ ⇔ δδz  δδz′ for all z, z′ ∈ L0. Hence u(z) > u(z′)⇔ v(z) > v(z′) for all z, z′ ∈ L0.
Theorem 3. Proof. Case 1 is shown below, and case 2 can be proven in a similar way (by
changing all the signs). Suppose RDU holds for N .
There are two cases two consider:
(a) f, f ′ have more than 2 elements:
Let f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn), f ′ = (z1, p1; ...z′i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈ L0
such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1). Suppose that, for some a ∈ (0, 1) and some
z ∈ (z′i, z′i+1),
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz
Since RDU holds:
f ∼N f ′ ⇒ VRDU (f) = VRDU (f ′)
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⇒ v(z1) +
i−1∑
j=2
w(p∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] + w(p∗i )[v(zi)− v(zi−1)] + w(p∗i+1)[v(zi+1)− v(zi)]
+w(p∗i+2)[v(zi+2)− v(zi+1)] +
n∑
j=i+3
w(p∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] =
v(z1) +
i−1∑
j=2
w(p∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] + w(p∗i )[v(z′i)− v(zi−1)] + w(p∗i+1)[v(z′i+1)− v(z′i)]
+w(p∗i+2)[v(zi+2)− v(z′i+1)] +
n∑
j=i+3
w(p∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)]
⇒ w(p
∗
i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
=
v(z′i)− v(zi)
v(zi+1)− v(z′i+1)
(1)
Note that af+(1−a)δz = (z1, ap1; ...zi; api; z, 1−a; zi+1, api+1; ...; zn, apn), where the ranking
of z is due to z ∈ (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1). Similarly, af ′ + (1− a)δz = (z1, ap1; ...z′i; api; z, 1−
a; z′i+1, api+1; ...; zn, apn). Using the condition
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz
it follows that
⇒ v(z1) +
i−1∑
j=2
w(ap∗j + 1− a)[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] + w(ap∗i + 1− a)[v(zi)− v(zi−1)]
+w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)[v(z)− v(zi)] + w(ap∗i+1)[v(zi+1)− v(z)]
+w(ap∗i+2)[v(zi+2)− v(zi+1)] +
n∑
j=i+3
w(ap∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] ≥
v(z1) +
i−1∑
j=2
w(ap∗j + 1− a)[v(zj)− v(zj−1)] + w(ap∗i + 1− a)[v(z′i)− v(zi−1)]
+w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)[v(z)− v(z′i)] + w(ap∗i+1)[v(z′i+1)− v(z)]
+w(ap∗i+2)[v(zi+2)− v(z′i+1)] +
n∑
j=i+3
w(ap∗j )[v(zj)− v(zj−1)]
⇒ w(ap
∗
i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
≥ v(z
′
i)− v(zi)
v(zi+1)− v(z′i+1)
(2)
Combining (1) and (2), we obtain:
w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
≥ w(p
∗
i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
(3)
Note that this does not depend on the utility function v, but only on the weighting function
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w. Take any f˜ = (z˜1, p1; ...z˜i; pi; z˜i+1, pi+1; ...; z˜n, pn), f˜ ′ = (z˜1, p1; ...z˜′i; pi; z˜
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; z˜n, pn)
and z˜ such that z˜ ∈ (z˜′i, z˜′i+1) ⊂ (z˜i, z˜i+1). It must be that af˜ +(1−a)δz˜ N af˜ ′+(1−a)δz˜.
Suppose not, i.e. suppose that af˜ ′ + (1 − a)δz˜ N af˜ + (1 − a)δz˜. Then, redoing a similar
calculation to the one above, we obtain:
w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
<
w(p∗i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
(4)
which contradicts (3). Hence ISC holds for this case.
(b) f, f ′ have exactly 2 elements:
Let f = (z1, 1−p; z2, p), f ′ = (z′1, 1−p; z′2, p) ∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′1, z′2) ⊂ (z1, z2).
Suppose that, for some a ∈ (0, 1) and some z ∈ (z′1, z′2). If N satisfies RDU, then:
f ∼N f ′ ⇒ v(z1) + w(p)[v(z2)− v(z1)] = v(z′1) + w(p)[v(z′2)− v(z′1)]
⇒ w(p) = v(z
′
1)− v(z1)
[v(z′1)− v(z1)] + [v(z2)− v(z′2)]
⇒ w(p)
1− w(p) =
v(z′1)− v(z1)
v(z2)− v(z′2)
(5)
Since af+(1−a)δz = ((z1, a(1−p); z, 1−a; z2, ap) and af ′+(1−a)δz = ((z′1, a(1−p); z, 1−
a; z′2, ap), the condition af +(1−a)δz N af ′+(1−a)δz implies (using a similar calculation
to the one used for obtaining (3)) that
⇒ w(ap)
1− w(ap+ 1− a) ≥
v(z′1)− v(z1)
v(z2)− v(z′2)
(6)
and combining (4) and (5), it follows that
⇒ w(ap)
1− w(ap+ 1− a) ≥
w(p)
1− w(p) (7)
As before, this does not depend on the v′s, but only on the weighting function w. Take any
f˜ = (z˜1, 1 − p; z˜2, p), f˜ ′ = (z˜′1, p1; z˜′2, p2) and z˜ such that z˜ ∈ (z˜′1, z˜′2) ⊂ (z˜1, z˜2). It must be
that af˜ + (1− a)δz˜ N af˜ ′ + (1− a)δz˜. Suppose not, i.e. suppose that af˜ ′ + (1− a)δz˜ N
af˜ + (1− a)δz˜. Then, redoing a similar calculation to the one above, we obtain:
⇒ w(ap)
1− w(ap+ 1− a) <
w(p)
1− w(p) (8)
which contradicts (7). Hence ISC holds for this case as well, which completes the proof.
The following lemma is used in the proof of theorem 4:
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Lemma 2t. Let w : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. Take any p, q, p′, p′ ∈ [p, p] ⊆ [0, 1] such that p > p′ > q′,
q > q′. Then if w is concave on [p, p]:
w(p)− w(q)
p− q ≤
w(p′)− w(q′)
p′ − q′
if w is convex on [p, p]:
w(p)− w(q)
p− q ≥
w(p′)− w(q′)
p′ − q′
Proof. The proof is only shown for a concave function w. We make use of the following well-
known result that a function f is concave if and only if for any p˜ > q˜ > r˜,
f(p˜)− f(q˜)
p˜− q˜ ≤
f(p˜)− f(r˜)
p˜− r˜ ≤
f(q˜)− f(r˜)
q˜ − r˜ (9)
We now directly prove the claim for each of the three possible cases:
(i) p > q > p′ > q′
Using (9) twice,
w(p)− w(q)
p− q ≤
w(q)− w(p′)
q − p′ ≤
w(p′)− w(q′)
p′ − q′
(ii) p > p′ > q > q′
Using (9) twice,
w(p)− w(q)
p− q ≤
w(p′)− w(q)
p′ − q ≤
w(p′)− w(q′)
p′ − q′
(iii) p > p′ = q > q′
In this case, the result follows immediately from (9):
w(p)− w(q)
p− q ≤
w(q)− w(q′)
q − q′ =
w(p′)− w(q′)
p′ − q′
which completes the proof.
Theorem 4. Proof. Suppose that N satisfies RDU. We first show (A) that the weighting
function w is concave implies that for any f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn),
f ′ = (z1, p1; ...z′i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1), and
for all a ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ (zi, zi+1),
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz
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We then prove the converse (B).
Proof of (A) Suppose that the weighting function w is concave. We proceed by contradiction.
There are two cases to consider:
(a) f, f ′ have more than two elements: Let f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn), f ′ =
(z1, p1; ...z′i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1).
Suppose there exists some a ∈ (0, 1) and some z ∈ (zi, zi+1) such that af ′ + (1 − a)δz N
af + (1− a)δz. Using the derivation of theorem 3, it follows that
w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
<
w(p∗i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
(10)
We now show:
(I) w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2) ≥ a
(
w(p∗i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
)
Note that p∗i+1 > p
∗
i+2 > ap
∗
i+2, since a ∈ (0, 1), and using the definition of p∗. It is
immediate that ap∗i+1 > ap
∗
i+2. It follows, therefore, from lemma 2t, that:
w(p∗i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
p∗i+1 − p∗i+2
≤ w(ap
∗
i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
ap∗i+1 − ap∗i+2
Rearranging, we obtain w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2) ≥ a
(
w(p∗i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
)
.
(II) w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a) ≤ a
(
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
)
Note that ap∗i +1−a > p∗i , since a, p∗i ∈ (0, 1) implies that 1−a > p∗i (1−a). Similarly,
ap∗i+1 + 1− a > p∗i+1, and we know that p∗i > p∗i+1. Using lemma 2t, it follows that:
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
(ap∗i + 1− a)−
(
ap∗i+1 + 1− a
) ≤ w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
p∗i − p∗i+1
Rearranging, we obtain w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a) ≤ a
(
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
)
Combining (I) and (II) (noting that both sides of (II) are greater than zero), it follows that
w(ap∗i+1)− w(ap∗i+2)
w(ap∗i + 1− a)− w(ap∗i+1 + 1− a)
≥ w(p
∗
i+1)− w(p∗i+2)
w(p∗i )− w(p∗i+1)
(11)
which is a contradiction of (10).
(b) f, f ′ have exactly 2 elements:
Let f = (z1, 1−p; z2, p), f ′ = (z′1, 1−p; z′2, p) ∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′1, z′2) ⊂ (z1, z2).
Suppose there exists some a ∈ (0, 1) and some z ∈ (z1, z2) such that af ′ + (1 − a)δz N
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af + (1− a)δz. Using the derivation of theorem 3, it follows that
w(ap)
1− w(ap+ 1− a) <
w(p)
1− w(p) (12)
We now show:
(I) w(ap) ≥ aw(p)
a ∈ (0, 1) and so p > ap > 0. It follows from the well-known result (9) used in proving
lemma 2t that:
w(p)− w(0)
p
≤ w(ap)− w(0)
ap− 0
Using w(0) = 0 and rearranging, we obtain w(ap) ≥ aw(p)
(II) 1− w(ap+ 1− a) ≤ a (1− w(p))
Note that 1 > ap+1− a > p, since it is immediate from a, p ∈ (0, 1) that a > ap and
1− a > p(1− a).
Using (9) again,
w(1)− w(ap+ 1− a)
1− (ap+ 1− a) ≤
w(1)− w(p)
1− p
Using w(1) = 1 and rearranging, we obtain that 1− w(ap+ 1− a) ≤ a (1− w(p)).
Combining (I) and (II), we obtain
w(ap)
1− w(ap+ 1− a) ≥
w(p)
1− w(p) (13)
which contradicts (12).
Proof of (B) Suppose that for any f = (z1, p1; ...zi; pi; zi+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn),
f ′ = (z1, p1; ...z′i; pi; z
′
i+1, pi+1; ...; zn, pn) ∈ L0 such that f ∼N f ′, and (z′i, z′i+1) ⊂ (zi, zi+1), and
for all a ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ (zi, zi+1),
af + (1− a)δz N af ′ + (1− a)δz
We proceed as follows: (a) we first show that there is no interval [p, p] ⊆ [0, 1] on which w
is strictly convex; (b) we then show that there is no interval [p, p] ⊆ [0, 1] such that for all
p ∈ [p, p], w(p) is ‘under the diagonal’, i.e. w(p)−w(p)p−p >
w(p)−w(p)
p−p >
w(p)−w(p)
p−p (note that with
stronger smoothness assumptions this would be sufficient for concavity); (c) we use results (a)
and (b) to prove that w must be concave. We first note that it follows from the claim and from
the derivation of theorem 3 that:
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a) ≥
w(p1)− w(p2)
w(p0)− w(p1) (14)
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for all 0 ≤ p2 < p1 < p0 ≤ 1 and a ∈ (0, 1).
(a) We proceed by contradiction: suppose there does exist an interval [p, p] ⊆ [0, 1] on which w
is strictly convex. Let p < p2 < p1 < p0 < p, and let { pp2 ,
1−p
1−p0 } < a < 1. It follows that
p < ap2 < ap1 < ap1 + 1− a < ap0 + 1− a)p. Using lemma 2t, it follows that:
w(p1)− w(p2)
p1 − p2 >
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
ap1 − ap2 (15)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
(ap0 + 1− a)− (ap1 + 1− a) >
w(p0)− w(p1)
p0 − p1 (16)
Rearranging and combining (15) and (16), it follows that
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a) <
w(p1)− w(p2)
w(p0)− w(p1)
which contradicts (14).
(b) We proceed again by contradiction: suppose that there does exist an interval [p, p] ⊆ [0, 1]
such that w(p)−w(p)p−p >
w(p)−w(p)
p−p >
w(p)−w(p)
p−p for all p ∈ [p, p].
Let a = 1 − (p − p) + , for an arbitrarily small . Let p˜ = p/a. Using result (a), [p˜, p˜ + δ]
cannot be strictly convex, for any δ ∈ (0, 1− p˜]. We can therefore find {p0, p1, p2} ∈ [p˜, p˜+δ]
such that p2 < p1 < p0 and
w(p1)− w(p2)
p1 − p2 ≥
w(p0)− w(p1)
p0 − p1 (17)
As δ,  become arbitrarily small (and aδ ≤ ), ap2 → p, ap0+1− a→ p and {ap2, ap1, ap1+
1− a, ap0 + 1− a} ∈ [p, p]. We therefore have that for small enough δ, ,
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
(ap0 + 1− a)− (ap1 + 1− a) >
w(p)− w(p)
p− p (18)
and
w(p)− w(p)
p− p >
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
a(p1 − p2) (19)
Combining (18) and (19):
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a) <
p1 − p2
p0 − p1 (20)
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Combining (17) and (20), we obtain:
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a) <
w(p1)− w(p2)
w(p0)− w(p1)
which contradicts (14).
(c) We now prove that w is concave. Suppose not, i.e. suppose there exist 0 ≤ p < q < r < 1
such that
w(r)− w(q)
r − q >
w(q)− w(p)
q − p (21)
Let a = 1 − (r − q) + , for an arbitrarily small . Let p˜ = q/a. Using result (a), [p˜ − δ, p˜]
cannot be strictly convex, for any δ ∈ (0, p˜]. We can therefore find {p0, p1, p2} ∈ [p˜ − δ, p˜]
such that p2 < p1 < p0 and
w(p1)− w(p2)
p1 − p2 ≥
w(p0)− w(p1)
p0 − p1 (22)
As δ,  become arbitrarily small (and aδ ≤ ), ap1 → q, ap0 + 1− a→ r, {ap2, ap1} ∈ (p, q]
and {ap1 + 1− a, ap0 + 1− a} ∈ [q, r].
Using result (b), we have can find some (small enough) δ,  such that
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
a(p1 − p2) ≤
w(q)− w(p)
q − p (23)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a)
(ap0 + 1− a)− (ap1 + 1− a) ≥
w(r)− w(q)
r − q (24)
Combining (21, (23) and (24) we have
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a) <
p1 − p2
p0 − p1 (25)
Combining (22) and (25), we have
w(ap1)− w(ap2)
w(ap0 + 1− a)− w(ap1 + 1− a) <
w(p1)− w(p2)
w(p0)− w(p1)
which contradicts (14), and completes the proof.
Theorem 5. Proof. AxiomsA.1-A.4 imply thatN is a weak order and that Jensen-continuity
holds. The proof for the RDU representation then follows from Wakker (1994).
As in theorem 2, for any f ∈ L0, δH(f) ∼N f . Since w(1) = 1, it follows that v(H(f)) =
v−1 (VRDU (f)), and hence H(f) = v−1 (VRDU (f)).
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Theorem 6. Suppose that axioms A.1 through A.4 and the RDU axioms hold, and let u and
v be the utility functions associated with the resolved and unresolved lotteries, respectively, and
w be the decision weight associated with the unresolved lotteries. In addition, suppose that u, v
are both differentiable. Then:
(i) If there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that p < w(p), then there exists an f ∈ L0 such that δf  f .
Similarly, if there exists p′ ∈ (0, 1) such that p′ > w(p′), then there exists an f ′ ∈ L0 such that
f ′  δ′f .
(ii) If  exhibits doubt-aversion, then p ≥ w(p) for all p ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, if u exhibits
stronger diminishing marginal utility than v (i.e. u = λ◦v for some continuous, weakly concave,
and increasing λ on v([z, z¯])), then N violates quasi-concavity. (that is, there exists some
f ′, f ′′ ∈ L0, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f ′  f ′′ and f ′′ N αf ′ + (1− α)f ′′).
Similarly, if  exhibits doubt-proneness, then p ≤ w(p) for all p ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, if v exhibits
stronger diminishing marginal utility than u , then N violates quasi-convexity. (that is, there
exists some f ′, f ′′ ∈ L0, and α ∈ (0, 1) such that f ′  f ′′ and αf ′ + (1− α)f ′′ N f ′).
Proof. (i) Suppose not, i.e. suppose that there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that p < w(p), and that
f  δf for all f ∈ L0. Let f = (z; 1− p; z + , p) for some z ∈ Z, p ∈ L0, 0 <  < z¯ − z. Since
f  δf , by continuity (and using the certainty axiom), there exists a z˜ ∈ (z, z + ) such that
f  [δz˜ ∼ δδz˜ ]  δf . Hence:
(1− p)u(z) + pu(z + ) ≥ u(z˜)
w(p) (v(z + )− v(z)) + v(z) ≤ v(z˜)
Rearranging:
p ≥ u(z˜)− u(z)
u(z + )− u(z)
w(p) ≤ v(z˜)− v(z)
v(z + )− v(z)
Hence:
u(z˜)− u(z)
u(z + )− u(z) −
v(z˜)− v(z)
v(z + )− v(z) ≤ p− w(p)
But as  → 0, u(z˜)−u(z)u(z+)−u(z) → u
′(z)
u′(z) , and
v(z˜)−v(z)
v(z+)−v(z) → v
′(z)
v′(z) , by differentiability. Since the left-
hand-side goes to 1− 1 = 0 in the limit, while the right-hand-side does not change, it must be
that 0 ≤ p− w(p). But this is a contradiction, since p < w(p).
The second part of the result can be proved in a similar manner, for the case p′ > w(p′).
(ii) The result is only shown for doubt-aversion; a similar reasoning holds for doubt-proneness.
By the contrapositive of (i), it is immediate that if f  δf for all f ∈ L0, then w(p) ≤ p for all
p ∈ (0, 1). Now suppose that f  δf for some f, and that u is a (weakly) concave transformation
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of v. If w is not concave, then N cannot be quasi-concave, by Wakker (1994) theorem 25.
Since w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1, w(p) ≥ p for a concave function. We have that w(p) ≤ p, and so
it suffices to show that w(p) < p for some p. Suppose not. That is, w(p) = p for all p. Since
u is more concave than v, it must be that u−1(EU(f)) ≤ v−1(EV (f))(that is, the certainty
equivalent of f for the informed lotteries is not bigger than the certainty equivalent of f for
the unresolved lotteries, by a well known result). However, since f  δf , it must also be that
u−1(EU(f)) > v−1(EV (f)), which is a contradiction.
Note that if f ∼ δf for all f ∈ L0, than trivially, u is a linear transformation of v, and w(p) = p.
Corollary. Proof. If N displays mean-preserving risk-aversion, then w(p) is convex, by Chew,
Epstein and Safra (1986) or Grant, Kajii and Polak (2000). Since w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1, it must
be that p ≥ w(p). Since δf  f , it follows from result (ii) that p ≤ w(p). Hence w(p) = p,
implying that N satisfies expected utility.
Since δf  f for all f ∈ L0, and both u and v are of EU form, umust be a concave transformation
of v. This is well-known, see for instance Kreps-Porteus (1978).
Preservation of self-image. For an agent who is doubt-prone and risk-averse for both resolved
and unresolved lotteries, the following holds:
C(e) ≡ u ◦ v−1(Ev(t))−
∑
m
p(m|e)u ◦ v−1(Ev(t|m, e)) ≥ 0
Proof. Note that u ◦ v−1(·) is concave. Hence
∑
m
p(m|e)u ◦ v−1(Ev(t|m, e)) ≤ u ◦ v−1
(∑
m
p(m|e)(Ev(t|m, e))
)
≤ u ◦ v−1
(∑
m
p(m|e)
∑
t
p(m|t, e)p(t)
p(m|e) v(t)
)
≤ u ◦ v−1
(∑
m
∑
t
p(m|t, e)p(t)v(t)
)
≤ u ◦ v−1
(∑
t
∑
m
p(m|t, e)p(t)v(t)
)
≤ u ◦ v−1
(∑
t
p(t)v(t)
)
= u ◦ v−1(Ev(t))
Doubt-neutrality result. Proof. If (i) holds, then it is trivial that (ii) and (iii) hold as well.
To show that (ii) ⇒ (i):
Suppose not. Then there exists an f ∈ L0 such that either f  δf or δf  f . Suppose
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f  δf . Then by lemma 1, there exists an H(f) ∈ Z such that δf ∼ δH(f). By transitivity,
f  δf ⇔ f  δH(f), and so by (ii), δf  δδH(f) . By transitivity again, δH(f)  δδH(f) , but
this violates the certainty axiom A.1. Now suppose that δf  f . Then δH(f)  f , and by (ii),
δδH(f)  δf ⇔ δδH(f)  δH(f), which violates A.1.
To show that (iii) ⇒ (i):
Suppose not. Then there exists an f ∈ L0 such that either f  δf or δf  f . Suppose that
f  δf . Note that by continuity, it is also the case that there exists an H˜ ∈ Z such that
f ∼ δH˜(f). By the certainty axiom A.1, δH˜(f) ∼ δδH˜(f) . By transitivity, δδH˜(f)  δf , and by (iii),
δH˜(f)  f . But this is a contradiction. Now suppose that δf  f . Then δf  δδH˜(f) ⇔ f  δH˜(f)
which is a contradiction.
References
[1] M. Abdellaoui. A genuine rank-dependent generalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility theorem. Econometrica, 70(2):717–736, 2002.
[2] S. Adam, S. Wiggins, PWhyte, M. Bloch, M. Shokeir, H. Soltan, W. Meschino, A. Summers,
O. Suchowersky, J. Welch, M. Huggins, J. Theilmann, and M. Hayden. Five year study of
prenatal testing for huntington’s disease: demand, attitudes, and psychological assessment.
Journal of Medical Genetics, 30:549–556, 1993.
[3] G. Akerlof and W. Dickens. The economic consequences of cognitive dissonance. American
Economic Review, 72(3):307–319, 1982.
[4] M. Allais. Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats
de l’ecole americaine. Econometrica, 21(4):503–546, 1953.
[5] L. Bartels. Uninformed votes: Informational effects in presidential elections. American
Journal of Political Science, 40(1):194–230, 1996.
[6] D. Bell. Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 30:961–981,
1982.
[7] D. Bell and P. Fishburn. Probability weights in rank-dependent utility with binary even-
chance independence. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 47:244–258, 2003.
[8] R. Benabou. Ideology. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2–3):321–352,
2008.
[9] R. Benabou and J. Tirole. Self-confidence and personal motivation. Quartely Journal of
Economics, 117(3):871–915, 2002.
45
[10] R. Benabou and J. Tirole. Belief in a just world and redistributive politics. Quartely Journal
of Economics, 121(2):699–746, 2006.
[11] R. Benabou and J. Tirole. Identity, dignity and taboos: Beliefs as assets. Working paper,
2006.
[12] S. Berglas and E. Jones. Drug choice as a self-handicapping strategy in response to non-
contingent success. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(4):405–417, 1978.
[13] M. Brunnermeier and J. Parker. Optimal expectations. American Economic Review,
95(4):1092–1118, 2005.
[14] A. Caplin and J. Leahy. Psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory feelings.
Quartely Journal of Economics, 116(1):55–79, 2001.
[15] J. Carrillo and T. Mariotti. Strategic ignorance as a self-disciplining device. Review of
Economic Studies, 67:529–544, 2000.
[16] S. H. Chew, E. Karni, and Z. Safra. Risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with
rank dependent probabilities. Journal of Economic Theory, 42:370–381, 1986.
[17] O. Compte and A. Postlewaite. Confidence-enhanced performance. American Economic
Review, 94(5):1536–1557, 2004.
[18] E. Dekel. An axiomatic characterization of preferences under uncertainty: Weakening the
independence axiom. Journal of Economic Theory, 40:304–318, 1986.
[19] E. Diecidue and P. Wakker. On the intuition of rank-dependent utility. Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty, 23(3):281–298, 2001.
[20] D. Dillenberger. Preferences for one-shot resolution of uncertainty and allais-type behavior.
Working paper, 2008.
[21] R. Dudley. Real Analysis and Probability. Cambridge University Press, New York NY,
2002.
[22] D. Ellsberg. Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
75(4):643–669, 1961.
[23] D. Ellsberg. Risk, Ambiguity and Decision. Garland Publishing, New York NY, 2001.
[24] L. Epstein and S. Zin. Substitution, risk aversion, and the temporal behavior of consumption
and asset returns: A theoretical framework. Econometrica, 57(4):937–969, 1989.
[25] I. Good. Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability and Its Applications. University
of Minnesota Press, 1983.
46
[26] S. Grant, A. Kajii, and B. Polak. Intrinsic preference for information. Journal of Economic
Theory, 83:233–259, 1998.
[27] S. Grant, A. Kajii, and B. Polak. Temporal resolution of uncertainty and recursive non-
expected utility models. Econometrica, 68(2):425–434, 2000.
[28] F. Gul. A theory of disappointment aversion. Econometrica, 59(3):667–686, 1991.
[29] M. Hemphill. Pretesting for huntington’s disease: An overview. Hastings Center Report,
3(3):12–13, 1973.
[30] D. Kahneman, J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler. Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion,
and status quo bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1):193–206, 1991.
[31] E. Karni. Decision Making Under Uncertainty. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA,
1985.
[32] E. Karni and Z. Safra. Rank-dependent probabilities. Economic Journal, 100(401):487–495,
1990.
[33] B. Koszegi. Ego utility, overconfidence, and task choice. Journal of the European Economic
Association, 4(4):673–707, 2006.
[34] D. Kreps. Notes on the Theory of Choice. Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1988.
[35] D. Kreps and E. Porteus. Temporal resolution of uncertainty and dynamic choice theory.
Econometrica, 46(1):185–200, 1978.
[36] G. Loomes and Sugden R. Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under
uncertainty. The Economic Journal, 92(368):805–824, 1982.
[37] M. Machina. Choice under uncertainty: Problems solved and unsolved. Economic Perspec-
tives, 1(1):121–154, 1987.
[38] M. Machina. Dynamic consistency and non-expected utility models of choice under uncer-
tainty. Journal of Economic Literature, XXVII:1622–1668, 1989.
[39] S. Pinker. The Stuff of Thought. Penguin Group, New York NY, 2007.
[40] D. Prelec. The probability weighting function. Econometrica, 66(3):497–527, 1998.
[41] J. Quiggin. A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
3:323–343, 1982.
[42] W. Samuelson and R. Zeckhauser. Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 1:7–59, 1988.
[43] L. Savage. The Foundations of Statistics. Dover Publications, New York NY, 1972.
47
[44] U. Segal. Two-stage lotteries without the reduction axiom. Econometrica, 58(2):349–377,
1990.
[45] L. Selden. A new representation of preferences over ”certain x uncertain” consumption pairs:
The ”ordinal certainty equivalent” hypothesis. Econometrica, 46(5):1045–1060, 1978.
[46] R. Sugden. An axiomatic foundation for regret theory. Journal of Economic Theory,
60:159–180, 1993.
[47] A Tyler, O. Quarrell, L. Lazarou, A. Meredith, and P. Harper. Exclusion testing in preg-
nancy for huntington’s disease. Journal of Medical Genetics, 27:488–495, 1990.
[48] P. Wakker. Separating marginal utility and probabilistic risk aversion. Theory and Decision,
36:1–44, 1994.
[49] M. Yaari. The dual theory of choice under risk. Econometrica, 55(1):95–115, 1987.
[50] M. Zeelenberg. Anticipated regret, expected feedback and behavioral decision making.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12:93–106, 1999.
48
